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COLORADO RIVER GOVERNANCE:
SHARING FEDERAL AUTHORITY AS AN
INCENTIVE TO CREATE A NEW
INSTITUTION
DAVID

H. GETCHES*

INTRODUCTION

The Colorado is one of the world's great rivers. Touching
seven states, two nations, and dozens of Indian reservations,
receiving visits from people around the world, and providing
drinking water, food, and electricity to millions of people, it is
claimed by almost everyone. But no one takes responsibility for
accommodating all these uses; no one holds a vision of what the
river can or must be for the future. Instead, the river has been
the object of constant conflict. Only recently have there been
signs that its problems can be resolved cooperatively and that its
multiple, competing uses can be reconciled.
This article recommends a broader, more participatory
process for exercising the substantial authority, which now rests

* The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable ideas contributed and the
information shared through conversations and writings of many people, especially
Kenley Brunsdale, Bruce Driver, Frank Gregg, Douglas Kenney, Larry MacDonnell,
Scott McElroy, Tom Moody, Robert Pelcyger, Dale Pontius, Betsy Rieke, and Joseph
Sax. None of them has reviewed or approved this elaboration, however, and should
not be blamed for any of it.
Christopher Wirth, University of Colorado School of Law Class of 1997,
participated in the research underlying the article, and he and Todd Olinger, Class
of 1998, are responsible for much of the footnoting and documentation. Thanks to
them for their hard work and to the editors and staff of the University of Colorado
Law Review for their patience and assistance.
Preparation of this article was assisted by the Rockefeller Foundation, which
supported the author's residency at the Bellagio Center, where the article was
conceived and written.
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with the Secretary of the Interior (the "Secretary"), to develop a
comprehensive vision for the Colorado River's management. If
the parties necessary to the success of that process do not convene
voluntarily, the Secretary can use his powers to encourage and
promote their participation. History teaches us that the Secretary must use those powers strategically to encourage voluntary
action. Because the other parties necessary for this process may
not readily accept governance responsibilities, the Secretary must
be prepared to direct events.
In general, the federal government should exercise restraint
in the use of its great statutory powers to manage the Colorado
River. It should promote cooperative basin solutions that fulfill
federal legal obligations. To accomplish this, the Secretary
should share the authority recognized in statutes, treaties, and
Supreme Court decisions with all the interests that are significantly affected. Constrained only by the requirements of existing
legal mandates, the Secretary could heed the advice of a
consortium of these interests, effectively delegating a degree of
decisionmaking authority to them.
There have been two themes in the history of the Colorado
River: legal and political combat over entitlements to quantities
of water, and concentration of great authority over the Colorado
River in the federal government. These themes are embodied in
an array of federal laws known collectively as "the law of the
river." The basic allocative laws-two congressionally approved
interstate compacts,1 a treaty,2 a federal statute,3 and a U.S.

1. Colorado River Compact of 1922, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-61-101 (1990). The
compact allocates 7.5 million acre-feet of water per year, assumed to be less than half
the average virgin flow, to the lower basin states of Arizona, California, and Nevada,
and the balance to the upper basin states of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming. See id. art. III(a); Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat.
31, 33 (1949) (allocating a percentage of upper basin water annually to: Colorado,
51.75%; Utah, 23%; Wyoming, 14%; New Mexico, 11.25%; Arizona, 50,000 acre-feet
per annum); see also David H. Getches, Competing Demandsfor the ColoradoRiver,
56 U. COLO. L. REV. 413, 419 (1985) (discussing assumptions of Compact drafters
concerning available flows).
2. Treaty Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers
and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219, 1237 [hereinafter USMexico Treaty] (allocating 1.5 million acre-feet per year of the Colorado River to
Mexico).
3. Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1994) (authorizing
construction of Hoover Dam and effectively dividing the lower basin's share as
interpreted by Arizona v. California,373 U.S. 546 (1963)).
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Supreme Court decision 4 -essentially sort out rights to consume
certain quantities of water.' After difficult negotiations early this
century, the states achieved a gross division of rights by arbitrarily dividing the entire river basin into two sub-basins-upper
and lower-and by purporting to allocate about one-half of the
water to each sub-basin. After that, the states squabbled over
every detail of the allocations, causing the leading historian of the
Colorado River to call it the "Rivei of Controversy."'
Lacking funds of their own to develop and use their apportioned water, states then competed for federal aid to build dams
and other facilities to enable their consumption of Colorado River
water. Because of their failure to reach negotiated solutions and
their acceptance of massive federal charity, most of the authority
for allocating and managing the Colorado River was legally
vested in the federal government under statutes that authorized
project construction.7 Speaking of the Secretary's power to
allocate Colorado River water, the Supreme Court said that
where federal contracts "carry out a congressional plan for the
complete distribution of waters to users, state law has no place."'
Plainly, Congress has preempted the operation of state water
law in the allocation of water rights and the distribution of water
from the Colorado River, the largest surface water source for the
seven western states it touches--Arizona, California, Colorado,
New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming. This may seem
shocking in the context of western history and politics, which
bristle with antagonism toward federal intervention, especially in
matters that might infringe upon state autonomy to control
water.' One might expect cries to liberate the states from the
4. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 579, 600 (1963) (construing Boulder
Canyon Project Act to allocate the lower basin's share under the Colorado River
Compact as follows: 2.8 million acre-feet to Arizona, 4.4 million to California, and
.3 million to Nevada; recognizing and quantifying reserved water rights for five
mainstream tribes).
5. See Lawrence J. MacDonnell & David H. Getches, ColoradoRiver Basin, in
6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 5, 51-55 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1994) (summarizing the
law of the river, including several statutes and other laws that go beyond allocation
of rights to use water).
6. See Norris Hundley, Jr., The West Against Itself. The ColoradoRiver-An
InstitutionalHistory, in NEw COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIvER: MAJOR ISSUES FOR
THE NEXT CENTURY 9, 9 (Gary D. Weatherford & F. Lee Brown eds., 1986).
7. See, e.g., Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 620 (1994); Colorado
River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1501 (1994).
8. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 588.
9. See, e.g., NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND

576

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

overbearing federal government's control of water. Yet the states
generally resist any fundamental change in the law of the river
as it stands. They have grudgingly accepted federal control of the
water as a Faustian consequence of accepting tax dollars collected
elsewhere to develop water projects for their use. Moreover, in
practice, states have been included in some policy-making for the
Colorado River. The Secretary has consulted with them in major
policy issues, partly as a matter of comity; the law requires
consultation with states and other parties in setting operating
criteria for the federal facilities. 0
Although federal policies for the Colorado River are narrow
and fragmented," Colorado River issues affect a broad array of
interests. Colorado River issues include questions about the
supply of water for cities or agriculture, generation of electricity,
provision of fish habitat, preservation of endangered species,
satisfaction of Indian treaty rights, and accommodation of whitewater rafting. These issues create conflicting demands and
implicate values that are not comprehensively represented in
decisionmaking institutions for the Colorado River. The most
pervasive problem in the governance of the Colorado River, then,
has been the exclusion of diverse values and views.
Having grown out of a preoccupation with allocating rights to
consume Colorado River water, the law of the river ignores the
wider range of values that people in modern society hold for the
Colorado River. The consequences of their exclusion are manifest

1770s-1990s (1992) (general history of water development and use in
California); Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriersto Watershed Protection,25 ENVTL.
L. 973, 1016 (1995) (history of Reclamation Act); Gregory Harwood, Forfeiture of
Rights to Federal Reclamation Project Waters: A Threat to the Bureau of
Reclamation, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 153, 158 (1992) (state law and control of reclamation
project water); Bennett W. Raley, Chaos in the Making: The Consequencesof Failure
to Integrate Federal Environmental Statutes with McCarran Amendment Water
Adjudications, 41 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 24-1, 24-13 to 24-21 (1995).
10. See Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1552(b) (1994).
11. See, e.g., Adrian N. Hansen, The EndangeredSpecies Act and Extinction of
Reserved Indian Water Rights on the San JuanRiver, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1305, 1343
(1995); Larry MacDonnell & Bruce Driver, Rethinking ColoradoRiver Governance,
in THE COLORADO RIVER WORKSHOP: ISSUES, IDEAS, AND DIRECTIONS 181 (Feb. 2628, 1996) (sponsored by the Grand Canyon Trust under a cooperative agreement with
the Bureau of Reclamation) (on file with author); Sergio J. Viscoli, The Resource
Conservation Group Proposalto Lease ColoradoRiver Water, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J.
887, 906 (1991); Symposium, Water Allocation Issues on the ColoradoPlateau,13 J.
ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 369, 382-84 (1993) (Duncan Patten speaking
at the University of Utah's Symposium on the Colorado Plateau).
WATER,
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in economically wasteful, politically inequitable, and ecologically
unsustainable uses of natural resources in the Colorado River
basin. Some commentators blame the present condition of the
Colorado River on existing laws and urge fundamental changes.12
Though the legal arrangements made early in the century to
allocate Colorado River water may seem imperfect and incomplete, it is not necessary to revamp them in order to satisfy
today's values and demands. The law of the river has evolved: a
broad realm of policies addressing water quality, endangered
species, and recreation temper the early preoccupation with
consumptive uses.13 These statutory additions to the law of the
river call for a more integrated consideration of resource values.
Unfortunately, some of them have been treated as subservient to
the allocative laws, 4 and others have been applied as if they were
part of an entirely disconnected body of law.' 5 But such lapses
need not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the law of the
river must be replaced or reformed root and branch.
I believe that the awkwardness and the intractability of most
of the Colorado River's problems reflect the absence of a venue to

12.

See JASON I. MORRISON ET AL., THE SUSTAINABLE USE OF WATER IN THE

LOWER COLORADO RIVER BASIN x-xi, 2, 4 (1996) (noting that the law of the river "has
been amended, modified, and refined throughout the century as unsolvable problems
and unique circumstances have [occurred] ... [and that further] improving or
modifying the Law of the River... is a viable option."); see also Lower ColoradoRiver
Oversight HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Water and Power of the Senate Comm.
on Energy and Nat. Resources, 103d Cong. 186-89 (1994) (statement of Gary D.
Weatherford); Gilbert F. White, A New Confluence in the Life of the River, in NEW
COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER: MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE NEXT CENTURY, supra
note 6, at 215, 221-23; Colorado Water Stirs Debate, ENG'G NEWS-REC., Nov. 22,
1984, at 13.
13. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994); Colorado
River Basin Salinity Control Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1572 (1994); Grand Canyon Protection
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4669 (1992).
14. See, e.g., Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1592 (1994).
Although salt-loading is related to consumptive uses of Colorado River water
allocated by the law of the river, see infra Part I.C.2, responsibility for dealing with
its effects has been assumed by the United States, and the remedies are premised
on a federal obligation to find solutions that do not require curtailing consumptive
uses. See 43 U.S.C. § 1512 ('[S]atisfaction of the requirements of the Mexican Water
Treaty... constitutes a national obligation."); see also TAYLOR 0. MILLER ETAL., THE
SALTY COLORADO 76-77 (1986) (discussing who should be required to pay for salinity
control projects on the Colorado River).
15. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544. There have been virtually no attempts to
coordinate the endangered species recovery efforts in the basin with decisions on
major river and dam operations. See discussion and recommendations infra Part
III.B.3.
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deal comprehensively with Colorado River basin issues. This has
led me to call for the establishment of a new entity that recog-

nizes and integrates the interests and people who are most
affected by the outcome of decisions on major Colorado River
issues.' One model for such an entity would be a Colorado River
Basin Authority formed by the voluntary agreement of the seven
states in the Colorado River basin and sanctioned by an act of
Congress (or an approved compact). 7 Recently, others have

16. See David H. Getches, A Colorado River Basin Authority: Opportunity for
Sharing River Basin Management and Resources, in Boundaries and Water:
Allocation and Use of a Shared Resource 2 (Natural Resources Law Ctr., University
of Colo. Sch. of Law ed., 1989); David H. Getches, Pressuresfor Change in Western
Water Policy, in WATER AND THE AMERICAN WEST: ESSAYS INHONOR OF RAPHAEL J.
MOSES 143, 159-60 (David H. Getches ed., 1988); Getches, supra note 1, at 479; David
H. Getches, Water Allocation During Drought in Arizona and Southern California:
Legal and Institutional Responses, in Severe, Sustained Drought in the
Southwestern United States, Phase I Report, at Pt. 2 (1991) (on file with author);
David H. Getches, This Process is Out of Control, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Nov. 16,
1992, at 14; see also Lawrence J. MacDonnell et al., The Law of the Colorado River:
Coping with Severe Sustained Drought, 31 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 825, 835 (1995);
MacDonnell & Getches, supranote 5, at 55.
The idea is not original. Several negotiators of the Colorado River Compact of
1922, COLO.REV. STAT. § 37-61-101 (1990), favored creation of a permanent Colorado
River Commission. See NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., WATER AND THE WEST: THE
COLORADO RIVER COMPACT AND THE POLITICS OF WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST 181
(1975). The proposal was not included in the compact but the idea of a Colorado
River Authority was perpetuated and vigorously advocated in REUEL OLSON,
COLORADO RIVER COMPACT 195-210 (1926). Gilbert White concluded, based on
discussions at a 1983 conference, that "[a] means might be found to bring together
from inside and outside the basin a group representative of the diverse interests in
water and related land resources to assess possible actions beyond those specified in
the compact." White, supra note 12, at 223. Others at the conference urged
consideration of the idea. See, e.g., Paul L. Bloom, Law of the River: A Critiqueof an
ExtraordinaryLegal System, in NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER: MAJOR
ISSUES FOR THE NEXT CENTURY, supra note 6, at 139, 143; see also KAI N. LEE & Jo
S. CLARK, WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASS'N, THE WESTERN HYDRO SYSTEM 28 (1985)
(report of a three-person task force, of which this author was a member, suggesting
a basin council for the Colorado basin like the Northwest Power Planning Council
in the Columbia basin, see infra note 19).
17. See David H. Getches, A ColoradoRiver Basin Authority: Opportunityfor
Sharing River Basin Management and Resources, in Boundaries and Water:
Allocation and Use of a Shared Resource, supra note 16, at 7, for the proposal that
an "Authority" be constituted with representation by state, tribal, and federal
governments, and interests such as water users, power customers, fish and wildlife,
and recreation. The Authority would make decisions on reservoir operations,
including power generation, flood control, and storage for compact deliveries, salinity
control measures, water development projects, ecosystem protection, endangered
species recovery, compact enforcement and interpretation, fulfillment of Indian
reserved rights, interstate water marketing, drought planning, and use of power
revenues. See id.
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examined the issue in more detail and advocated the creation of
a commission or council for Colorado River basin governance
under an interstate compact. 8
My purpose here, however, is not to prescribe a perfect model
for Colorado River basin governance. Indeed, to design the "ideal"
institution to govern the Colorado River would be easier than to
persuade Congress and the states to accept the proposal. Absent
a major financial crisis or natural disaster, in the short run it will
remain politically infeasible to create an entirely new institution
for Colorado River governance. 9 As the Supreme Court has said,
"Government is a practical affair, intended for practical men."2
Thus, I believe that more comprehensive management of the
Colorado River is likely to occur incrementally, spurred by a
federal policy of selectively delegating existing powers as an
incentive for voluntary efforts to broaden the governance of the
river.
Several recent events suggest that the time is ripe to
encourage broadly inclusive, participatory problem-solving in the
18. See Douglas Steven Kenney, River Basin Administration and the Colorado:
Past Practices and Future Alternatives 439-58, 467-68 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Arizona) (on file with author) (proposing "Colorado River
Council" to be formed by compact, with participation by seven state governors and
the Secretary). Dr. Kenney's work is a thorough and analytical study of the concept
of the Colorado River basin governance; it deals with the subject after discussing
established methods of governance and evaluative criteria for institutional
performance, reviewing the legal and political control of interstate river basins
generally, setting out the peculiar history and institutions of the Colorado River
basin, and then evaluating those institutions. See also Charles W. Howe & W.
Ashley Ahrens, Water Resources of the Upper ColoradoRiver Basin: Problems and
PolicyAlternatives, in WATER AND ARID LANDS OF THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 169,
222 (Mohamed T. El-Ashry &Diana C. Gibbons eds., 1988) (discussing an interstate
commission to do studies, monitor agreements, and promote dialogue); MacDonnell
& Driver, supra note 11, at 210-12 (discussing "Colorado River Commission" to be
formed by compact with representatives of seven states and other interests).
19. A new institution, the Northwest Power Planning Council, was created
legislatively to deal with hydropower generation, power conservation, and salmon
issues in the Columbia River basin. See Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning
and Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839b (1994). It was established only after the
financial stability of the huge power-generating complex in the Northwest was
thrown into doubt by improvident decisions to build expensive, unnecessary, and
poorly planned nuclear power plants, and only with the aid of influential political
representatives in Congress. See John M. Volkman & Kai N. Lee, Within the
Hundredth Meridian: Western States and Their River Basins in a Time of
Transition,59 U. COLO. L. REv. 551, 562-65 (1988); see also Kai N. Lee, The Path
Along the Ridge: Regional Planningin the Face of Uncertainty,58 WASH. L. REV. 317
(1983).
20. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 472 (1915).
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Colorado River basin. There is a general trend toward collaborative, localized problem-solving, often within geographic areas
defined by watersheds. Throughout the West, typically under
pressure to comply with federal laws, citizens and local units of
government have formed coalitions within particular watersheds
and communities, and they have progressed in negotiating
solutions to natural resources issues ranging from public land
management and water quality to endangered species. 2 Within
the upper Colorado River basin, a consortium of interests
addresses endangered species issues.22
Indeed, a broadly
representative group now advises the Secretary on the operating
policy for the Glen Canyon Dam.2 3 Moreover, several proposals
have been made to reallocate Colorado River water using market
24
mechanisms ("water banks").
Change is in the wind and virtually every interest in the
Colorado River basin has needs that could be better met with new
arrangements. Although the Colorado River basin states have
participated in federal decisions and policies, each of them has
motives for seeking the collaboration of other states and interests
in the basin. California's water use has long exceeded its legal
entitlement and California now demands even more water to fuel
its rapid growth.25 Nevada, too, is growing fast and expects to
need more than its modest share of water soon.2" Arizona seeks
relief from the burdens of repaying the construction costs of the
long-sought federal Central Arizona Project. It would also like to
21. See, e.g., Natural Resources Law Ctr., University of Colo. Sch. of Law, The
Watershed Sourcebook: Watershed.Based Solutions to Natural Resource Problems
(1996). The majority of examples in this study involved locally generated solutions
to problems that would otherwise be subject to regulatory requirements and
solutions developed by "outsiders." Id. at 1-27 to 1-31; see also William Goldfarb,
Watershed Management: Slogan or Solution, 21 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 483 (1994).
22. See infra Part II.B. and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 147-48 and. accompanying text. Also, for several years, an
interstate body has operated under statutory authority to deal with Colorado River
salinity problems; it has operated successfully and cooperatively in dealing with
issues under its limited rubric. See Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, 43
U.S.C. § 1571 (1994); infra notes 191-97 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. See Emerging Water Shortages on the Colorado River: The Iron Law of
Demand Growth and Supply Unreliability,WATER STRATEGIST, Winter 1996, at 2
[hereinafter Water Shortageson the ColoradoRiver]; Lawrence J. MacDonnell, New
Options for the Lower Colorado River Basin 12-16 (Natural Resources Law Ctr.,
University of Colo. Sch. of Law, 1996).
26. See Water Shortages on the Colorado River, supra note 25; MacDonnell,
supra note 25, at 16-18.
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use cheap groundwater in the short run without losing its right
to get Colorado River water through the CAP in the future. The
upper basin states of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming
underutilize their shares of the river's water, and it appears that
they may never be able to consume those amounts of water or to
build long-promised federal water projects without harming the
habitat of endangered fish in violation of the strict requirements
of the Endangered Species Act."8 All the states worry about
salinity problems and how to meet their obligation to deliver
water to Mexico.' They are also concerned with water marketing
schemes,80 and they all care about rules for operating federal
dams and facilities and allocating the river's water.3 ' The stakes
are high but, with some exceptions, even the states that have
been invited to comment on proposed actions of the Secretary
have failed to address solutions. When they have acted, they
have addressed single problems but not comprehensive solutions,
with all issues on the table, that enable trade-offs and mutual
problem-solving. Most significantly, other affected interests have
been left out of decisions, their "participation" relegated to
responding to Federal Register notices. If they are displeased
they must mount collateral attacks through lawsuits and
lobbying. Presumably everyone would benefit if an equitable
means were found to eliminate the uncertainty that results from
the exclusion of other affected interests from decisionmaking.
In this article, I suggest several opportunities for the
Secretary to rely on a multi-interest group to develop policies for
governance of the resources of the Colorado River. Traditionally
excluded interests such as tribal governments, recreationists,
environmentalists, and scientists could cooperate in comprehensive efforts to solve Colorado River basin problems. Their
cooperation could lead incrementally to a permanent, basin-wide
institution, though that is neither a necessary outcome nor an
indispensable motive for pursuing cooperative efforts now.
My preferred option is that Colorado River basin problems be
addressed in consensus solutions that are developed by a group
27. MacDonnell, supra note 25, at 7-12. See generally Robert Jerome Glennon,
Coattailsof the Past: Using and Financingthe Central Arizona Project, 27 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 677 (1995).
28. See infra notes 276-99 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 163-71 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 198-255 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 355-65 and accompanying text.
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representing parties both inside and outside the federal government, and that are consistent with existing federal legal mandates. The group, which would include one or more federal
representatives as coequal members, could seek a delegation of
federal authority or a federal agreement that their recommendation will be adopted as the federal solution. Alternatively, an
independently convened group could petition the Secretary to
adopt specific recommendations once it has reached agreement.
States are well-positioned to convene all the affected parties and
to collaborate in exploring and developing solutions because they
are accustomed to meeting together and the Secretary has
allowed them a consultative role in certain Colorado River
policies. If states or other outside parties do not facilitate a
process that widens the discussion, however, the Secretary should
convene all the affected interests around specific issues and
commission them to develop solutions. Such a process could
produce creative and durable solutions, and once a group was
convened, it could remain available to modify approaches to adapt
to changing conditions. In the long run, including all affected
parties in decisionmaking could move the Colorado River basin
toward more equitable, efficient, and sustainable governance.
I.

EVALUATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERAL DOMINANCE
OF THE COLORADO RIVER

The law of the river legally allocates gross quantities of water
to Indian tribes, among states, and between the United States
and Mexico under compact, 2 statute, 3 treaty, 4 and Supreme
Court decision.3" Federal legislation has authorized the expenditure of public money to subsidize development," enabling
consumptive use of the water that has been allocated to the
various states. The federal government has funded the construction of ten major Colorado River basin dams 3 -- including Hoover,

32. Colorado River Compact of 1922, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-61.101 (1990);
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, ch. 43, 63 Stat. 31, 33 (1949).
33. Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1994).
34. US-Mexico Treaty, supra note 2.
35. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
36. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 617; Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §
620 (1994); Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1501 (1994).
37.

See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, OPERATION OF THE

COLORADO RrvER BASIN 1995, PROJECTED OPERATIONS 1996,25TH ANNuAL REPORT,
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Glen Canyon, and Flaming Gorge--capable of generating vast
quantities of electrical power and irrigating more than 1.6 million
acres :of farmland with an annual crop value of $1.7 billion.8
Additionally, more than twenty-two million people in the West
rely on Bureau of Reclamation projects in the basin for municipal
and industrial water and for electrical power.8 9
All of the seven basin states (with the possible exception of
Nevada) sought and obtained federal commitments for substantial federal subsidization of water projects within their borders.
However, most of the Colorado River water stored in Bureau of
Reclamation projects benefits California and Arizona. Typically,
when a Colorado River basin state asked Congress to authorize
a project for its benefit, the other basin states used every legal
and political tool at their disposal to object, lifting their opposition
only when Congress met their demands for projects.4" A fortyfive-year binge of congressional log-rolling ended in 1968 with the
authorization of the Central Arizona Project ("CAP") along with
a package of several upper basin projects that other Colorado
River basin states demanded as a political quid pro quo41
Thereafter, few undeveloped sites remained where projects had
not been authorized, and Congress became more sensitive to
environmental impacts and became reluctant to spend enormous
sums on public water projects.
The results of water development in the Colorado River basin
can be evaluated from the perspectives of efficiency, equity, and
sustainability. These are values that society respects, and
satisfying them should be the objective of natural resource
management.4 2 Colorado River policy has thus far been deficient
in serving each of these values.

at 5-19 (1996).
38. See id. at 42-43 tbl.4.
39. See id. at 63-65 tbl.10.
40. See HELEN INGRAM, WATER POLITICS: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (1990);
MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING
WATER 281-316 (1986); see also RUSSELL MARTIN, A STORY THAT STANDS LIKE A DAM
280-84 (1989).
41. See Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 620(a)(1); see also
REISNER, supra note 40.
42. See SARAH F. BATES ET AL., SEARCHING OUT THE HEADWATERS: CHANGE AND
REDISCOVERY IN WESTERN WATER POLICY 201 (1993).
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Efficiency

Efficiency demands careful management to satisfy a variety
of societal values for natural resources; it eschews waste.
Efficiency can be measured by balancing the costs and benefits of
a particular commitment of resources. Natural resource economists rely on cost-benefit analyses to screen out wasteful or
inefficient water projects and uses. Sound conservation policy,
however, must go beyond simple accounting to consider "benefits"
and "costs" that are difficult to value economically but that are
widely shared.4 Resource values such as biological diversity,
recreational uses, and scenic beauty are usually left to the
political process. Economic analyses were prepared in advance of
some of the development of the Colorado River, but these studies
simply weighed the "hard" values of water distribution and power
generation against construction costs.44 Ultimately, federal
subsidies enabled the development of water projects that were
inefficient even by traditional cost-benefit accounting standards,
45
which do not consider environmental and other social costs.
The initial allocations of rights to consume Colorado River
water were designed not to pursue efficient water uses but to
achieve a politically acceptable division. At the time of the 1922
Compact, California was developing more rapidly than the other
six Colorado River basin states.4 8 Arizona feared that California
would monopolize the federal largesse necessary to exploit the
Colorado River. Colorado anticipated that California's prior use
of most of the Colorado River's resources would give California
water rights superior to other states, just as prior use established
a hierarchy of rights between individual users within states that
followed the prior appropriation water rights doctrine. 47 Thus, in
1922, the Colorado River basin states negotiated a compact
reflecting an ostensibly equal division of rights to consume

43.

See BONNIE COLBY SALIBA & DAVID B. BUSH, WATER MARKETS IN THEORY

AND PRACTICE: MARKET TRANSFERS, WATER VALUES,AND PUBLIC POLICY 1-33 (1987).

44. In contrast, environmentalists defeated dams in the Grand Canyon by
invoking both economic analysis of dam operations and political concerns about
destroying precious resources that are difficult to value. See REISNER, supra note 40,
at 295-303.
45. See RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES,
PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 44-45 (1989).
46. See HUNDLEY, supra note 16, at 178-80.
47. See id.

1997]

COLORADO RIVER GOVERNANCE

Colorado River water between the upper basin states (Colorado,
New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) and the lower basin states
(Arizona, California, and Nevada).48
Once the division was made, the states were challenged to
put their water to use. California saw the Compact as a predicate
to federal assistance in building the Hoover Dam.49 The federal
government built projects, first for California, then for the other
states.5' For the other states, the specter of California's development remained a threat. Because the Compact provided only
theoretical protection of the states' ability to use water in the
future, they eagerly sought physical means to develop, store, and
distribute the water allocated to them. The Secretary typically
contracted with water users and local districts to deliver water
from federal facilities, charging them the negligible costs of
operation and maintenance.5 ' Although the projects were
expensive to construct, many dams generated electric power that
produced cash to repay much of the government's construction
costs. By law, only the costs of generating power were included
in the rate base charged to power customers, 52 and those costs
were kept down in part by making project construction costs "nonreimbursable" to the extent that they were dedicated to national
benefits like flood control." Today, the Western Area Power
Administration markets power from these projects at some of the
lowest wholesale rates in the region.54
The economic benefits of water development projects,
therefore, have been impressive. Generously subsidized by
federal contributions and with costs repaid by hydroelectric power
revenues, these water projects have provided agricultural
irrigators and expanding cities with low-cost water. Power costs

48. See id. at 192-95.
49.

See id. at 226.

50. See REISNER, supra note 40, at 150.
51. See id. at 482; see also WAHL, supra note 45, at 52.
52. See 43 U.S.C § 617 (1994); 43 U.S.C § 620 (1994); 43 U.S.C § 1501 (1994).
53. See generally WAHL, supranote 45, at 27-46. The Reclamation program's
total expenditures of $16.9 billion were considered 78% reimbursible. Of the
reimbursible portion, irrigators were to repay $7.1 billion. They are now required
to pay only $3.4 billion, however, because much of the burden has been shifted to
others, mostly power customers. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, INFORMATION ON
ALLOCATION AND REPAYMENT OF COSTS OF CONSTRUCTING WATER PROJECTS 4

(GAO/RCED-96-109 1996).
54. See Jim Bishop, A Water-Based Electric Empire Is Hit by a Flood of
Criticism, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, July 13, 1992, at 10; see also infra note 134.
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have been so low that cheap, publicly generated power is widely
available to assist the development of the desert Southwest.
The development of the Colorado River, however, has led to
excessive use of natural resources. More water has been consumed because of the federal government's subsidies.55 This was
the purpose of the projects: to enable the states to make consumptive use of the water apportioned to them under compacts,
statutes, and court decisions. Although the projects achieved that
objective, they were not economically efficient.' Because of cheap
irrigation water, some farmers benefited from higher profits while
other farmers brought lands into agricultural production that
would not otherwise have been economically viable.5 7 Further,
most cost-benefit analyses of water projects did not account for all
costs, including losses of fish and wildlife, recreational opportunities, and ecological integrity. 8 Today, however, it appears that
in parts of the Colorado River basin, recreation, fish, and wildlife
have higher value than either hydropower or agricultural uses.5"
Federal subsidies for irrigation in the Colorado River basin
led to increased cultivation of marginal lands that otherwise
would have had little or no agricultural output." Some land is
simply not well-suited to irrigated agriculture. In the upper
basin, much of the land is located at high altitudes where growing
seasons are short. Upper Colorado River basin land is also highly
saline in many places. It can be kept productive only by flushing
it with large quantities of irrigation water, by growing salttolerant crops, or by constructing drainage systems to "speed the
61
flow of return water out of the soils."

55.
56.

See WAHL, supra note 45, at 45.
See id. By "economically efficient," it is meant that absent federal subsidies,

the marginal returns on irrigation projects equal or exceed the marginal costs.
57. See id.
58. It was not until after most of the projects in the Colorado River system had
been authorized that the United States government began attempts to account for
environmental and social factors in water project criteria. See INGRAM, supra note
40, at 14-15.
59. A recent study estimated that in the upper Colorado River region the
average values of an acre-foot of water, by types of use, were $51 for recreation, fish,
and wildlife; $21 for hydropower; and $5 for irrigation. In the lower basin they were
$597 for recreation, fish and wildlife; $35 for hydropower; and $88 for irrigation. See
Kenneth D. Frederick et al., Economic Values of Freshwater in the United States,
Discussion Paper 97-03, at 17 (Oct. 1996) (on file with author).
60. See WAHL, supra note 45, at 45.
61.

MILLER ET AL., supra note 14, at 9.
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The Wellton-Mohawk story is a legendary, if extreme,
example of the perverse effects of subsidies in the Colorado River
basin. 2 Farmers in the Wellton-Mohawk District took up
homesteads on federal land in the Arizona desert."3 The federal
government then supplied them with irrigation water from the
Gila River Project." Years of heavy irrigation of lands resulted
in salt build-up in soils and wells along the Gila River.6 5 Farmers
then beseeched the federal government to build facilities that
would bring water from the Colorado River to flush salt from
their lands. The Bureau of Reclamation complied, providing
respite until the groundwater basin filled with salty water that
began killing crops. Again the farmers sought federal aid and got
an expensive project to pump down the aquifer and pipe the
brackish water to the Colorado River.67 The new federal pipeline
dumped the salty water into the Colorado River at the Mexican
border, making the river water diverted by Mexican irrigators so
saline that it was toxic to crops.' That precipitated an international incident when the Mexican government protested that it
was unacceptable for the United States to deliver salty water in
fulfillment of the 1.5 million acre-feet treaty commitment.6 9
To address the Mexican salinity problem and make peace
with Mexico, the United States embarked on another costly
construction project, extending the Wellton-Mohawk wastewater
pipeline to a point below the Mexican intake.7 ° However, the
extension of the wastewater pipeline reduced the delivery of
water to Mexico under the U.S. treaty.7 1 To increase the amount

62. See PHIuP L. FRADKIN, A RIVER NO MORE: THE COLORADO RIVER AND THE
WEST 302-05 (1995); see also RIcHARD L. BERKMAN &W. Kip Viscusi, DAMMING THE
WEST 41-45 (1973); David H. Getches, From Ashkabad, to Wellton-Mohawk, to Los
Angeles: The Drought in Water Policy, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 523, 531 (1993).
63. Homesteaders first settled in the Gila River bottomlands of the WelltonMohawk Valley in 1857. See FRADKIN, supra note 62, at 302; see also Act of Aug. 30,
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-511, 78 Stat. 686; Act of Oct. 28, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-299, 79
Stat. 1101.
64. The Gila River Project was authorized by the Act of May 25, 1928, ch. 742,
Pub. No. 508, 45 Stat. 739. The Act of July 30, 1943, Pub. L. 272, ch. 382, 61 Stat.
628, altered its boundaries to include the Wellton-Mohawk District.
65. See FRADKIN, supra note 62, at 302.
66. See id. at 302-03.
67. See id. at 303.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 303.15; see also US-Mexico Treaty, supra note 2.
70. See id. at 304.
71. See id; see also US-Mexico Treaty, supra note 2.
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of acceptable-quality water delivered to Mexico, the United States
then agreed to build several more projects to remove salt from the
river upstream. The most ambitious and expensive feature of this
program was an enormous desalination plant.72
Congress and the Bureau of Reclamation apparently did not
reach their decisions based on economic considerations, nor did
they weigh the foreseeable consequences for the environment or
for relations with Mexico. Had they accounted for the consequences and costs imposed on the nation and the range of
interests affected by their actions, the Wellton-Mohawk projects
would have seemed foolhardy." The economic value of crops
produced by the farmers in the district could not justify even the
interest-free capital costs of the facilities that the federal
government built for their benefit.74 In a free market system,
where irrigators pay their own costs and are responsible for the
consequences of their actions, most of the Wellton-Mohawk lands
would not continue to be irrigated even if the impacts on natural
systems and international relations were disregarded.
Federal subsidies have also assisted urban development. The
benefits of urban uses better justify project costs than do those of
agricultural uses. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that proponents of
the Reclamation program contemplated subsidizing municipal
growth.75 Further, federal subsidies have not been necessary for

72. See FRADKIN, supra note 62, at 313.
73. Assuming that the problems caused by the initial project could not have
been foreseen, it would have been rational to curtail further subsidies once the
negative consequences of the government's investment became apparent. A lower
cost solution to the Mexican salinity problem would have been to pay the WelltonMohawk farmers to use efficient irrigation methods. See REISNER, supra note 40, at
482. It even would have been cheaper to retire land in the Wellton-Mohawk District
from irrigated farming by purchasing it from the farmers. See id. The Bureau of
Reclamation estimated in 1979 that it would cost $266 million to acquire all of the
private property in Wellton-Mohawk, including the cost of retiring the federal
investment in the district. See FRADIUN, supra note 62, at 313. At that time, the cost
of the desalination plant had risen to $333 million with an annual operation cost of
$14 million. See id. at 313-14. To solve the problem, it would not have been
necessary to retire all of the land. See Getches, supra note 62, at 534 n.54.
74. The United States has not asked the 120 irrigators in the district to pay
back the hundreds of millions of dollars spent to preserve the means to continue
their livelihood. The irrigators have been excused from repaying virtually all of the
cost of constructing even the facilities they use directly because of a federal policy
that relieves beneficiaries of repayment responsibilities where costs exceed their
ability to pay. See WAHL, supranote 45, at 33.
75. The chief proponent of the Reclamation Act of 1902, Congressman Francis
G. Newlands of Nevada, stated, "[T]he very purpose of [the Reclamation Act] is to
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cities because of the relative ease with which municipalities can
finance water development independent of federal assistance.7"
More than one-third of the water consumed from the Colorado River is used for municipal and industrial purposes, most of
it exported out of the basin (for example, to Los Angeles). 7
Although the cities pay more for the water than agricultural
users, the rates for municipal water from federally subsidized
Bureau of Reclamation projects remain low. Since water exported
to cities has high economic value, cities and their consumers, who
both benefit from Colorado River water, do not need the federal
subsidies. If cities paid the full costs of developing federal water,
they would presumably continue consuming and paying for it
unless and until they developed a comparable source at a better
price.
Federal subsidies create incentives to consume Colorado
River water. Promoting consumption may have served the
original, single-minded goal of the Colorado River basin states as
they raced to perfect their allocations through full use. Today,
however, it makes no sense to perpetuate subsidies when California's use already exceeds its legal claim," natural systems are in
distress from depletions and damming of the Colorado River,79
and competition among uses is great.80 The federal subsidy only
delays the cities' use of alternative sources of water.
Project facilities on the Colorado River continue to provide
agricultural and municipal waters and flood control protection,
but the everyday operating regime of releases is dictated largely
by demands for hydroelectric power. The federal investment in
water facilities has generated valuable electric power that has
created substantial economic benefits and revenues to repay

guard against land monopoly and to hold land in small tracts for the people of the
entire country." FRADKIN, supra note 62, at 275.
76. Local governments can finance water projects using municipal bonds
secured by tax and user charges. See NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, WATER POLITICS
FOR THE FUTURE 448-49 (1973); see also RODNEY T. SMITH, TROUBLED WATERS:
FINANCING WATER IN THE WEST 33-64 (1984).
77. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO
RIVER SYSTEM CONSUMPTIVE USES AND LOSSES REPORT 1981-1985, at 19-22 tbls.C-2,
C-3, C-4, C-5 (1991).
78. California consumed more than 5.2 million acre-feet in 1996. See Water
Shortages on the ColoradoRiver, supra note 25, at 2. It began exceeding its annual
4.4 million acre-feet entitlement in the 1950s. See REISNER, supra note 40, at 139.
79. See infra Parts I.B.2 and I.C.
80. See generally Getches, supra note 1.
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project costs.8 1 However, the operation of dams to maximize

power output and the impact of their obstruction of the river have
caused environmental damage, the costs of which are external to
decisions about dam construction and dam operating policies.
Like subsidies for western water users, providing federally
subsidized power is difficult to justify on policy grounds.
B. Equity
The idea that water is a social good-something setting it
apart from ordinary commodities and property-leads to the
conclusion that it should be distributed fairly and in the broad
interests of the public. From earliest times, individuals were
given priorities in the use of water on the condition that they
fulfill certain reciprocal obligations to society that were publicly
enforced. 2 As the West developed, however, private water rights
were elevated to the detriment of public values."3 Today, western
water law is evolving, albeit in fits and starts, toward a recognition that water is more than an economic good, and that it is
essential to the vitality of natural systems, watersheds, and
communities.' A greater consciousness of the public importance
of water has led to calls for judging water institutions based on
the equity, or justice, of the resulting allocation and distribution
of the resource. 5 Ultimately, equity demands that water serve a
broad range of public interests and a process for reaching
decisions that is generally fair.
The history of the Colorado River is riddled with examples of
clear winners and losers, haves and have-nots. 6 This history has
led Professor Helen Ingram to recommend several principles for

81. See, e.g., Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617d (1994); 43 U.S.C.
618a(b) (1994); see also WESTERN GOVERNORS' AS'N, THE WESTERN HYDRO SYSTEM
i-ii (1985). "Water development was authorized to encourage economic development
in the West which would in turn stimulate the nation's economy .... Id. at 6. In the
Southwest the principal purpose of the federal investment was to aid agriculture, but
hydroelectric power has been a "valuable by-product . . . to repay . . . project
construction [costs]." Id.
82. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 1330a-b.
83. See, e.g., BATES ETAL., supra note 42, at 170-71.
84. See, e.g., id.; see also Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in
Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 317 (1985).
85. See BATES ETAL., supranote 42, at 182-87.
86. See INGRAM, supra note 40, at 8-23 (describing the winners and losers in the
history of Colorado River development).
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judging the equity of water policy. The principles include the
ideals of sharing advantages and costs, respecting all legitimate
uses, accommodating everyone in the allocation and decisionmaking processes, keeping promises, and being responsible to
future generations.8 7 In several respects, the history of governance of the Colorado River basin fails her tests for equity.
Professor Ingram concludes that "[h]ad the principle of full and
fair participation in allocation decisions been followed in the past,
many of the most troublesome issues faced today in Indian water
rights would have been avoided."' The same can be said of other
issues-relations with Mexico, the allocation of the burdens of
salinity control, development promises to the upper basin states,
the deterioration of the natural environment, and the loss of
recreational opportunities.
In the future, the claims and interests of Indian tribes and
environmental and recreational interests will likely have great
importance in decisions about the Colorado River. Therefore, it
is instructive to consider the historical treatment of these two
important interests in the Colorado River basin from the perspective of equity.
1.

Indian Tribes

Since 1908, it has been clear that Indian tribes hold rights to
significant amounts of water from sources near their
reservations.89 The Supreme Court, in Winters v. United States,
held that when the United States and the tribes set aside lands
as Indian reservations, they also impliedly reserved enough water
to fulfill the purposes of the reserved land.9" More than fifty
years after the Supreme Court announced this principle, the
United States asserted the reserved water rights of the five tribes
along the mainstream of the Colorado River in litigation between
the states of Arizona and California. The decision in Arizona v.
9 1 was a landmark because it set the formula for
California
quantifying reserved water rights: for reservations made for
87. See Helen M. Ingram et al., Replacing Confusion with Equity: Alternatives
for Water Policy in the ColoradoRiver Basin, in NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO
RIVER:
88.
89.
90.
91.

MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE NEXT CENTURY, supra note 6, at 177, 186-89.
Id. at 192.
See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
See id. at 576-77.
373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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agricultural purposes, water rights are to be measured according
to what is needed to irrigate all the practicably irrigable
acreage.92 On that basis, the tribes won rights to some 900,000
acre-feet of water from the Colorado River, about six percent of
the quantity allocated to the seven basin states by the 1922
Compact.9 3
Although the five mainstream tribes secured the right to use
a large quantity of water from the Colorado River, the adjudication did not address the claims of dozens of other tribes in the
Colorado River basin. Moreover, the apparent victory of the five
tribes was qualified in several respects. First, the acreage that
the United States claimed as irrigable was considerably less than
the acreage that the evidence would have supported. Second, the
tribes had to compete with subsidized non-Indian users in their
use of Colorado River water. Third, the tribes were subsequently
excluded from discussions among basin states about the Colorado
River, and the federal government did not consult the tribes in its
major decisions about the Colorado River and policies for the
river's management.
The Supreme Court in Arizona v. Californiaapproved in most
respects the recommendations of its appointed Special Master
and retained continuing jurisdiction.94 Years later, the five
mainstream tribes, who had relied upon government attorneys to
represent them in the case, hired their own lawyers and experts.
They discovered that they could have claimed, in the earlier
litigation, that additional lands were irrigable.95 The tribes
moved to intervene in the case, invoking the Court's continuing
jurisdiction.9 6 The United States joined with the tribes to assert
claims for additional water. A new Special Master was
appointed,9 7 and he agreed with the tribes' and United States'
claims that government attorneys could have claimed far more
water for the tribes in the earlier litigation.9 8 In his report, the

92. See id. at 600.
93. See Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964).
94. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 562-63.
95. Some of the reservation acreage had been calculated based on erroneous
surveys, some had not been properly classified, and relevant circumstances with
respect to other lands had changed since the decision.
96. See Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979).
97. See id. at 436.
98. See REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER ELBERT P. TUTrLE 5, 13 (Feb. 22, 1982);
Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979).
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Special Master recommended that the tribes' annual entitlement
to water be increased by about thirty-five percent, a total of
317,000 acre-feet for the five tribes." However, in Arizona v.
CaliforniaII, the Supreme Court rejected this recommendation
on the ground that it would upset the policy of providing water
users (non-Indians) with "certainty" in water rights
adjudications. 00 Thus the tribes, who had relied on the federal
government's flawed legal representation of them, were forever
locked into an adjudication that gave them less water than they
were entitled to claim. 10 '
Non-Indians have benefited far more from the use of Colorado River water claimed by tribes than have the tribes, resulting
in one of the great inequities in federal-tribal relations. In large
part, this is the result of the federal government's generous
subsidies for the development of Bureau of Reclamation projects.
In 1973, the National Water Commission opined that the government's failure to assert and protect tribal water rights, even as it
induced the development of water by non-Indians with rights
junior to those of tribes in the same rivers, was "one of the sorrier
chapters" in federal relations with Indian tribes.'
Despite the
expenditure of billions of federal dollars to develop waters of the
Colorado River, 0few
tribes have enjoyed any direct benefit from
3
federal projects.1

In addition to the five mainstream tribes whose water rights
were adjudicated in Arizona v. California, another twenty-five
reservations are located in the Colorado River basin, and many of
them assert water rights to the Colorado River or its
tributaries.'0" Although the full extent of tribal rights to Colorado
River water has not been determined, it is potentially immense.
For instance, the Navajo Nation, with its huge reservation, has

99. See Id. at 33-36.
100. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1983).

101. The tribes' attempts to assert a monetary claim against the government
for the Justice Department's failure to fully represent their interests were denied.
See Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 29 (1994).
102. See NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra note 76, at 474-75.
103. The National Water Commission concluded in 1973 that "with few
exceptions [federal irrigation] projects were planned and built by the Federal
Government without any attempt to define, let alone protect, prior rights that the
Indian tribes might have had in the waters used for the projects." Id. at 475. In the
West, only about one percent of all Indian agricultural lands are irrigated, compared
with 5.1% of all agricultural lands. See FRADKIN, supra note 62, at 164.
104. See MacDonnell & Getches, supra note 5, at 31-36.
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lands along the Colorado River in the Grand Canyon, and land on
tributaries of the Colorado River. Some of the tribes along the
Colorado River's tributaries are litigating their rights in state
courts; others are not.10 5
The tribes are faced with a conundrum. If a state joins the
United States as a defendant in a state court's general stream
adjudication, the federal government is obliged to assert tribal
reserved water rights." 6 If the government does not assert
sufficient rights for a tribe or does not litigate the matter
aggressively enough, the tribes nevertheless will be precluded
from later claiming greater water rights. 10 7 The size and needs of
the tribe may change in the future, and better information may
become available, but the tribe will be bound by the quantification of water rights once it is made. However, if a tribe intervenes on its own behalf, it will waive its sovereign immunity in
the subject matter, 08 incur enormous costs, and be forced to
litigate its water rights based solely on its present situation.
Most tribes nevertheless participate in water rights litigation to
protect their rights, because a binding final judgment is likely to
be reached with or without them. The expense and uncertainty
of water rights litigation in state courts have led several tribes
and states to seek negotiated settlements of their reserved water
rights claims. °9
Despite the magnitude of adjudicated Indian water rights
and potential tribal claims, tribes have rarely participated in
major Colorado River basin management decisions. The Secretary has plenary authority over the management of the Colorado
River," ' and he is charged with fulfilling the government's
fiduciary responsibility to Indians."' Nevertheless, these parallel

105. See ELIZABETH CHECCHIO & BONNIE G. COLBY, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS:
NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE 3-6 (1993); see also David H. Getches, Indian Water Rights
Conflicts in Perspective, in INDIAN WATER IN THE NEW WEST 7, 18-23 (Thomas R.

McGuire et al. eds., 1993).
106. See Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818
(1976); see also 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).
107. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1983); see also Nevada v.
United States, 463 U.S. 110, 145 (1983).
108. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 566 (1983);
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Adsit, 668 F.2d 1080, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 1982).
109. See sources cited supra note 105.
110. See discussion and citations infra Part III.A.1.
111.

See FELX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 225-28 (Rennard

Strickland ed., 1982) [hereinafter

COHEN].
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duties have not led the Secretary either to represent tribal
interests particularly well or to involve the tribes significantly in
decisionmaking processes. Several institutional constraints
frustrate the Secretary's representation of the tribes on Colorado
River issues. The most significant one is that the Secretary has
responsibilities that conflict with his fiduciary duty to tribes, such
as his responsibility to operate Bureau of Reclamation facilities
for the benefit of contracting parties.'12
Under a tradition of comity, the Secretary seeks advice from
states and informs them of his discretionary decisions on the
operation of dams and other facilities. However, the tribes have
not enjoyed similar consideration. Partly because of this tradition
of comity, the system of Colorado River water distribution and
management serves primarily the interests and economies of nonIndians. The federal government has limited its advocacy of
tribal rights to litigation where it has asserted reserved rights for
Indian reservations with claims to the Colorado River.
Unwilling to depend exclusively on federal representation,
the tribes have become more active in advocating their own water
rights. Ten of them recently joined to assert their interests in an
attempt to achieve political parity with the states."' However, it
is clear that they have not achieved influence comparable to that
of the states.
2.

Environmental and Recreational Interests

The Colorado River carves a path through diverse, unique
ecosystems that range from alpine headwaters to desert red-rocks
country, and from crashing white water to the braided delta that
ends in a trickle at the Sea of Cortez. These ecosystems have
changed radically in the last century. Flora and fauna have been
altered by development of the land, by depletion of the river's
flow, and by the destruction of its natural systems. Even the
landscape is dramatically different from its historical appearance.
112. See Reid Peyton Chambers, Committee on the Judiciary, A Study of

Administrative Conflict of Interest in the Protection of Indian Natural Resources,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 5, 240-41 (1971) (prepared for Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure, Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.); see also
COHEN, supra note 111, at 227-28.
113. See Position Paper of the Ten Tribes with Water Rights in the Colorado
River Basin (June 1992) (submitted to the seven states in the Colorado River basin)
(on file with author).
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"Lakes" behind giant dams inundate once-spectacular canyons
and hide rich cultural resources. The river's flow fluctuates
wildly as water is alternately stored and released according to
customers' demands for electricity.
This regime of power
generation has changed sediment transport patterns, destroyed
beaches and plant and animal habitat in the river corridor, and
made recreational boating difficult, especially through the Grand
Canyon. Today, most indigenous species of plants and fish are
gone and new species have infiltrated the area. Water no longer
reaches the mouth of the Colorado River in Mexico, which is now
a sprawling, eerie wasteland. These losses were foreseeable.
Naturalists and environmental activists warned of them.1 14
However, in proposing projects and developing operating plans for
them, the Bureau of Reclamation ignored their consequences for
natural systems and recreational uses.
All the major dams on the mainstream of the Colorado River
were built before the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)," 5 which requires a statement of environmental impact
("EIS") for every major federal project that has a significant
impact on the environment. Glen Canyon Dam was completed in
1963 and thus it, like the other great mainstream dams, was not
subject to an EIS, and its planning did not benefit from the public
participation and scrutiny that are accorded projects that do
receive EISs. In the 1950s, environmentalists opposed a major
dam near the confluence of the Green and Yampa Rivers. They
successfully mounted a national campaign against the project but
were unable to defeat another dam at Glen Canyon, for which
plans had matured behind closed doors."1 ' The environmentalists
were determined not to be excluded from future plans to obstruct
and control the river, but they had few legal devices until NEPA.
Once NEPA was enacted, citizens concerned about the
environment and recreational uses of the Colorado River sought
to use NEPA to open the doors of the agencies that made
Colorado River policy. 1 ' NEPA requires that every proposal for

114. See MARTIN, supra note 40, at 50-74.
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4347 (1994).
116. See MARTIN, supra note 40, at 66-72.
117. Environmentalists also challenged the Environmental Protection Agency's
approval of a program for controlling salinity in the Colorado River pursuant to the
Clean Water Act, but their challenge failed because the court deferred to the agency's
discretion. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (holding that the EPA Administrator need not require the establishment of
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a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment include the preparation of an EIS that is
subject to a full public airing.11 Environmentalists charged that
the federal government was not complying with NEPA's mandate
because its actions in storing and releasing water at the Glen
Canyon Dam injured the environment. The Bureau of Reclamation released more water from the dam when the demand for
electric power was greatest and the prices highest, and less when
the power prices were low. The Bureau's policy of maximizing the
value of electrical power created sharp daily fluctuations in the
Colorado River's flow that interfered with recreational uses and
damaged natural systems in the Grand Canyon.
Although construction of the dams preceded the enactment
of NEPA, pivotal decisions on their operations were necessarily
made after its effective date.1 19 Recreational users sued, alleging
that changes in operation, not just construction activity, at
Colorado River dams fell within the requirements of NEPA. 2 °
But the United States claimed that its ongoing operations were
business as usual, consistent with an established regime that had
long been encouraged by the entities buying electric power and
consented to by the states.121 The government argued that
maintaining the status quo required no major policy changes and
thus that there was no specific administrative "action" proposed
that would trigger the EIS requirement, no matter how environmentally destructive the operations might be. The court agreed
and denied any relief.122
The outcry against the federal government's dam operations
on the Colorado River grew, 2 ' but the public lacked an effective

salinity standards for each state through which the river passes).
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994) (EIS must be made available to public
under notice and comment provisions of Administrative Procedure Act); see also 40
C.F.R. pt. 1503.
119. The dams are operated according to long-range operating criteria that are
periodically reviewed and revised, and annual operating plans. See infra Part IIIAL
and III.B.2.b. The first such review was reflected in operational rules made in 1970.
See 35 Fed. Reg. 8951 (1970).
120. See Grand Canyon Dorries, Inc. v. Walker, 500 F.2d 588, 589 (10th Cir.
1974) ('The potential application of NEPA to the ongoing operation of a dam planned
and constructed prior to the passage of the Act could be a substantial issue.').
121. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
122. See GrandCanyon Dorries,500 F.2d at 591.
123. See, e.g., COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE GLEN CANYON ENVIRONMENTAL
STUDIES, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, RIVER AND DAM MANAGEMENT: A REVIEW
OF THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION'S GLEN CANYON ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES x-xi
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forum. More citizen lawsuits were brought to force the government to assess the environmental impacts of its Colorado River
dam operations in compliance with NEPA's provisions for public
participation. However, the courts often denied relief or deferred
to the discretion of the Bureau
of Reclamation in deciding the
124
timing and scope of an EIS.
A Bureau of Reclamation proposal for substantial uprating of
the generating capacity at Glen Canyon Dam attracted the
attention of environmentalists and recreation interests.125 They
pressured the Secretary to assess the proposal's environmental
impacts. The Bureau of Reclamation went ahead with its plans
but simultaneously prepared an environmental assessment. The
environmental assessment found that the proposal would have
2
significant impacts, warranting the preparation of an EIS.1 1
That finding and the Bureau of Reclamation's own request for
informal studies led Secretary James Watt to commission the
$6.8 million Glen Canyon Environmental Studies ("Glen Canyon
Studies") "to address the concerns of the public and federal and
state agencies about possible negative effects of the operations of
Glen Canyon Dam on downstream environmental and recreational resources." 27 The idea of scientific studies was generally
well-received by the public but, unlike an EIS, the studies by the
Bureau of Reclamation were not subject to the formal public input
required of an EIS. 128
However, the Glen Canyon Studies did not escape public
scrutiny. A special committee of the National Academy of

(1987) [hereinafter REVIEW OF GCES]; GRAND CANYON RIVER GUIDES, INC.,
PERSPECTIVES ON THE GLEN CANYON DAM ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT DRAFT

STATEMENT 4 (1994) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES ON GLEN CANYON DAM EIS].
124. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Higginson, 655 F.2d 1244
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
125. Uprating refers to rewinding the generators to increase the powergenerating capacity of the dam's turbines and to increasing the discharge rate
through the turbines.
126. See ENVIRONMENTALASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT
FOR THE GLEN CANYON POWER PLANT UPRATING (Dec. 9, 1982); see also REVIEW OF
GCES, supra note 123, at 9-10; PERSPECTIVES ON GLEN CANYON DAM EIS, supranote
123, at 3-4.
127. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, GLEN CANYON
ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES REVISED FINAL REPORT, at Summary and Principal
Conclusions (May 1989) [hereinafter GLEN CANYON REVISED FINAL REPORT]; see also
ColoradoRiver Hydroelectric Rates To Rise 46 Percent, ARIZONA-NEVADA REGIONAL
NEWS, June 27, 1990, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws file.
128. See PERSPECTIVES ON GLEN CANYON DAM EIS, supra note 123, at 4.

1997]

COLORADO RIVER GOVERNANCE

599

Sciences reviewed them and observed that their data and analysis
had advanced understanding of the far-reaching and complicated
effects of the dam's operations. The committee's report found that
the Glen Canyon Studies raised many new questions but did not
relate many of the findings to each other and possibly oversimplified the conclusions.129 The report recommended that additional
scientific studies be undertaken. 8 ° The quality and integrity of
the studies were important because the information generated
presumably would be used like an EIS-to inform important
decisions on river operations. 3 '
The Glen Canyon Studies confirmed that the dam adversely
affected environmental and recreational resources along the
3
Colorado River and through the Grand Canyon."'
The final
report based on the studies was careful to state, however, that the
studies were not intended to lead to any change in dam operations. 33 That disclaimer was apparently intended to disarm any
claims that the studies constituted an EIS and to rebut any
suggestion that modifications in dam operations required such
studies.
Further aroused by the disclaimer, environmentalists
persisted in trying to get the Department of the Interior to
establish an open public process for making operational decisions
at Glen Canyon Dam. When the Western Area Power Administration 34 proposed to implement a new marketing plan, the
environmentalists sued. 35 The court enjoined the agency from
issuing proposed fifteen-year contracts with power customers
3 In response, Secretary Manuel
without complying with NEPA."'
Lujan ordered the preparation of an EIS.3 7 Preparing the EIS
129.
130.
131.
132.
Principal
133.

See REVIEW OF GCES, supra note 123, at 1-15.
See id. at 3.
See id. at 1.2.
See GLEN CANYON REvIsED FINAL REPORT, supra note 127, at Summary &
Conclusions.
See id.

134. The Western Area Power Administration is the agency charged with
marketing and distributing the power generated by the Bureau of Reclamation's
facilities on the Colorado River. See 42 U.S.C. § 7152(a)(1)(D) (1996); see also
WESTERN AREA POWER ADMIN., 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1995).
135. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Western Area Power Admin., Civil No. 88-C1175G (D. Utah Sept. 1989); Bishop, supra note 54, at 14.
136. See National Wildlife Fed'n, Civil No. 88-C-1175G.
137. See Analysis of the Operating Criteria and Alternatives of Glen Canyon
Dam, AZ, Colorado River Storage Project, 54 Fed. Reg. 43,870 (1989) (notice of intent
to prepare a draft environmental impact statement).
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was to take two years, but it soon became clear that the process
would take much longer because of the complexity of the environmental issues and because of the level of public concern with the
continued destructive operation of the dam." 8
The Glen Canyon Environmental Studies had corroborated
the observations of environmentalists and recreational users. 3 9
In hearings on the scope of the EIS, these interests urged
immediate changes in river operations to avert further losses
during the long process that would continue the Glen Canyon
Studies. Citizens wrote letters to the Secretary and pressed
elected representatives to get the Secretary to make dam
operations less destructive rather than wait years for the findings
of the EIS. 4 ° Secretary Lujan responded in 1991 with interim
criteria for dam releases that were more protective of environmental and recreational resources.'4 1 Acknowledging public
dissatisfaction with the federal government's disregard of
environmental, cultural, and recreational values, Congress also
enacted the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992.142
Preparation of the EIS encompassed expanded scientific
studies of the impact of Glen Canyon Dam's effects on the
Colorado River through the Grand Canyon, continued for five
years, and resulted in a draft that was the subject of extensive
public comment and debate. 143 Then, in 1996 Secretary Bruce
Babbitt adopted revised operating criteria based on the Glen
Canyon Dam EIS's preferred alternative. 144 Although some
scientists and other members of the public were displeased with

138. See Barry Burkhart, Glen Canyon Study Requires More Time, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Nov. 12, 1989, at D12.
139. See REVIEW OF GCES, supra note 123; PERSPECTIVES ON GRAND CANYON
DAM EIS, supra note 123.
140. See Glen Canyon Dam Nudging Secretary Lujan, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 1,
1990, at C4; Lisa Jones, Reaction to Grand Canyon Controversy, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, July 10, 1990, at 12.

141. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEPT OF THE INTERIOR, OPERATION OF
GLEN CANYON DAM, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, Mar. 1995, at 3
[hereinafter GLEN CANYON DAM FINAL STATEMENT].
142. See Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, Tit. XVII,
106 Stat. 4669 (1992).
143. GLEN CANYON DAM FINAL STATEMENT, supra note 141, at 6.
144. See Operating Criteria and 1997 Annual Plan of Operations for Glen
Canyon, 62 Fed. Reg. 9447 (1997); see also SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF
DECISION, OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON DAM, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT (Oct. 9, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter GLEN CANYON DAM
RECORD OF DECISION].
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the outcome, 145 the process for reaching it involved much wider
public participation than ever before."4 Secretary Babbitt created
an Adaptive Management Work Group (the "Group") comprised
of diverse interests including the basin states, tribes, power
purchasers, recreational users, federal agencies, and environmental organizations. 147 The Group will propose modifications of
operating criteria and mitigation activities, among other things,
related to Glen Canyon Dam. 148 Never before has there been a
formalized decision process for Colorado River issues that has
been so broadly inclusive of different interests, albeit for operations of single facility.
C. Ecological Sustainability
The ideal of sustainability concedes that natural resources
will be used and that, in a world of human demands, complete
preservation of natural resources is unlikely. Sustainability has
ethical and natural science dimensions. It would avoid unnecessarily sacrificing the welfare of future generations to accommodate present needs. In addition, it recognizes the realities of
ecosystems; it demands that we not use one resource without
considering the effects of that use on the supply and vitality of
other resources and on the balanced operation of natural systems.
In the end, sustainability
connects long-term human survival
1 49
with ecological health.
Past policies do not meet the standard of ecological
sustainability. The natural systems of the Colorado River basin
are distressed because the river has been fully controlled by dams
and heavily used for agricultural, municipal, and power genera-

145. See William Stevens, Ecologists FindArtificialFloods Can't Restore Grand
Canyon, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 25, 1997, at A13. See generally GLEN CANYON DAM
RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 144 (summarizing comments on final EIS and
Secretary's comments).
146. See Jones, supra note 140, at 12; see also Notice of Public Meetings for
Glen Canyon Dam Draft EIS, 56 Fed. Reg. 10915 (1991).
147. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, CHARTER FOR THE ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT
WORK GROUP 3-4 (1997) (on file with author). The Adaptive Management Work
Group is a federally chartered advisory committee to advise the Secretary on Glen
Canyon Dam operations.
148. See id.; see also GLEN CANYON DAM RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 144.
149. See, e.g., PRESIDENTS COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,
SUSTAINABLE AMERICA: A NEW CONSENSUS 6-7 (1996); P.S. Elder, Sustainability,36
MCGILL L.J. 831, 836 (1991).
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tion purposes. 50 The federal government pursued development
of the Colorado River single-mindedly, without anticipating or
accounting for the consequences.' The result is a river incapable
of sustaining native fish species through much of its reach, a river
so salt-laden in its lower reaches that it kills plants and defies
human uses, and a river so depleted as it leaves the United States
that it has rearranged the natural landscape and everything that
depends on it.
1.

Endangered Fish

Endangered species can be a bellwether of collapse in
152
ecological systems; they signal threats to biological diversity.
Thus, the large number of threatened or endangered species in
the Colorado River system raises serious concerns about the
viability of the entire Colorado River basin ecosystem. Damming,
depletion, and the operation of power generation facilities on the
river have caused the extinction and near extinction of several
species of fish.'
Fish habitat has been radically modified,
stream channels degraded, water temperatures lowered, and
capacity for transporting sediment reduced. Wildlife agencies
have exacerbated problems by introducing non-native species of

150. For a discussion of the unsustainability of current water management in
the Colorado River, see JASON I. MORRISON ET AL., THE SUSTAINABLE USE OF WATER
IN THE LOWER COLORADO RIVER BASIN x-xi (1996). The authors note that long-term,
planned use of the Colorado River's water exceeds the available supply and that longterm pumping of groundwater exceeds the rate of replenishment in major portions
of the lower basin. Additionally, there are currently 24 federally listed threatened
or endangered species in the lower Colorado River "ecoregion." See id. at x. The
survival of these populations is threatened by the physical destruction of their
habitat caused by water withdrawals and the construction of major dams. See id.
Finally, global climatic changes have the potential to affect the Colorado River basin
water supply, hydroelectric generation, reservoir levels, and salinity, but these
potential changes have yet to be considered by water planners. See id. at xi.
151. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
152. See EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 258-60 (1992) (explaining
that the demise of many species is often part of a "holocaust" destroying an entire
ecosystem and numerous species endemic to it, while for others extinction is a "rifle
shot" where a single species is eradicated and its ecosystem is left intact).
153. See FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, RECOVERY
IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FOR ENDANGERED FISH SPECIES IN THE UPPER COLORADO

RIVER BASIN (Sept. 29, 1987) (on file at the Bureau of Reclamation, Region Six,
Denver, Colo.) [hereinafter RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM]; see also 50 C.F.R.
§ 424 (1980) (determining criteria and providing rules for endangered species and
designating critical habitat).
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sport fish that compete with and prey upon native fishes."' The
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (the "Service") has designated
nearly all of the 1980 river and reservoir miles of the Colorado
River as critical habitat for endangered native fishes.'5 5
2.

Salinity

The Colorado River carries about nine million tons of salt
each year. 56 About half of this salt content is human-induced,
mostly from irrigation practices.15 7 Irrigation degrades water
quality and can lead to increased salinity in the soil as well. 5 '
For example, return flows from irrigation in the Grand Valley of
Colorado add an estimated 580,000 tons of salt to the Colorado
River each year. 5 9 Consumption of water also creates higher
concentrations of salt in the river." ° As water is consumed, there
is less of it in the river to dilute salty agricultural return flows
and the seepage of saline water from natural sources. Even the
storage of water in reservoirs increases salinity because it is
subject to evaporation, which consumes about two million acrefeet of water per year in the Colorado River System. 61
After dams were built on the Colorado River, salinity
dramatically increased, causing difficulties for users lower on the
river where concentrations of salt were greatest. Salinity
increases water treatment costs for municipalities and reduces
the crop yields of irrigators. It is estimated that salinity causes
damages in excess of $750 million per year in the lower basin
62
states. 1

154. See RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM, supra note 153, at 1-3.
155. See 50 C.F.R. § 17 (1994). The ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (a)(3)(A), requires
the Secretary to designate habitat that is critical to the survival of any species listed
as endangered or threatened.
156. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 14, at xiii.
157. See id.
158. See id.; see also COMMITTEE ON IRRIGATION-INDUCED WATER QUALITY
PROBLEMS, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, IRRIGATION-INDUCED WATER QUALITY

PROBLEMS 37-41 (1989) [hereinafter IRRIGATION-INDUCED WATER QUALITY
PROBLEMS].
159. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 14, at 39.
160. See id. at xiii.
161. See Colorado River Board Salinity Control Forum, Water Quality
Standards for Salinity-Colorado River System 2-6 (1996) (on file with author).
162. See id. Losses to agriculture alone have exceeded $100 million per year.
See IRRIGATION-INDUCED WATER QUALITY PROBLEMS, supra note 158, at 16.
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The delivery of saline water to the Mexican border led to
strong objections from Mexico, as discussed earlier. 6 ' Negotiations between the United States and Mexico culminated in
promises by the United States to reduce the salinity of water
entering Mexico in fulfillment of the treaty entitling Mexico to 1.5
million acre-feet of water per year.'"
To address increasing salinity in the Colorado River, Congress enacted the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act
("CRBSCA") in 1974, directing the Secretary to institute a
program both to enhance water quality in the Colorado River for
United States uses and to meet the United States' obligations to
Mexico. 65 However, the CRBSCA lacked a comprehensive
watershed approach to the problem. The Act was passed to
address a single pollutant and relied primarily on specific,
expensive engineering solutions that intercepted or de-salted
saline water rather than land-use solutions. The CRBSCA also
provided for irrigation improvements and some nonstructural
166
controls, such as reduced return flows and water conservation.
The federal government has shouldered seventy percent of
67
the costs of salinity control, effectively subsidizing water users."
In the past, the federal government's salinity control program has
relied on expensive elaborate structural methods like desalination
because they are more palatable politically than are measures
that would change water use practices, such as retiring farmland.
As the marginal utility of structural measures declines, congressional tolerance for further spending may run out. Recently,
Congress amended the CRBSCA, authorizing the Secretary to
implement a basin-wide program of salinity control rather than
simply to construct individual projects. 16 Appropriations for
salinity control have declined since 1991, and Congress is

163. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
164. See US-Mexico Treaty, supra note 2.
165. See Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1571-1599
(1986).
166. See id. § 1571() (return flow reduction); § 1572 (canal lining); § 1573(a)(2)
(land acquisition). The salinity control efforts of the Department of Agriculture have
now been consolidated with other assistance programs for on-farm conservation. See
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat.
888 (1996).
167. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 14, at 76.
168. See Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act Amendments, Pub. L. No.
104-20, 109 Stat. 255 (1995).
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pressing for more cost-effective measures. 6 9 Thus, as the
marginal cost of new structural salinity control measures
increases, it is timely to consider shifting more of the financial
burdens of salinity control measures to water users. For instance,
lower basin interests (especially southern California, where much
Colorado River water is used) have the greatest need to reduce
salinity, but a principal source of salt-loading is the irrigation of
saline soils in the upper basin. 70 Market considerations could
lead to transactions in which lower basin users pay upper basin
irrigators to reduce the upper basin's contribution of salts to the
Colorado River through, for example, better irrigation methods
and the retirement of low-value irrigation.''
3.

Colorado River Delta and the Gulf of California

The Colorado River ends in a wide delta of. interlaced
channels where flowing water is now rare. The Colorado River
Delta is located below the Mexico-United States border at the
head of the Gulf of California (also known as the Sea of Cortez).
The delta's physical appearance, hydrology, fish, and wildlife
have changed markedly since the United States asserted full
control over the Colorado River. It was once one of the world's
great desert estuaries, 172 supporting 780,000 hectares of
wetlands.7 3 However, in the last 100 years, much of the upper
delta has been converted to farmland, and many of the lower
delta wetlands are now barren mud or salt flats. 1 4 Historically,
the United States has made water management decisions and
constructed water projects without regard for the impacts of
depletions and saline returns on the delta and the Gulf of Mexico.
In consequence, annual flows from the United States to the Gulf

169. See COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL FORUM, WATER QUALITY

1996 REVIEW, at 6-4 tbl.6-1
(1996); see also Pub. L. No. 104-20, 109 Stat. 255 (1995) (directing Secretary to
initiate cost-effective measures).
170. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 14, at 39.
171. See Howe & Ahrens, supra note 18, at 207-08, 219-22.
172. See generally ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 141-49 (1987).
173. See Edward P. Glenn et al., Effects of Water Management on the Wetlands
of the ColoradoRiver Delta, Mexico, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1175, 1176 (1996).
174. See Edward P. Glenn et al., Cienega de Santa Clara: Endangered Wetland
in the Colorado River Delta, Sonora, Mexico, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 817, 817-18
(1992).
STANDARDS FOR SALINITY, COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM,
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of Mexico have dwindled and the
quality of water feeding the
175
delta has diminished over time.
Despite the pollution and dewatering of the delta from
upstream activity, some wetland areas remain. 176 These vestigial
habitats have survived because of occasional excess flows that
occur when the major reservoirs in the United States are filled,
and because of the brackish drainage water provided by the
Wellton-Mohawk Outlet Drain Extension.' 7 The delta and its
associated wetlands provide critical habitat for shorebirds,
migratory waterfowl, and several endangered species, including
the desert pupfish and the Yuma clapper rail.'
Upstream Colorado River management has a reduction in the
gulf habitat of the totoaba fish. Together with fishing in the
upper gulf, the changed flow regime has pushed the totoaba,
which was listed as an endangered species in 1979,179 to the brink

of extinction."8 However, the United States is obligated under its
own Endangered Species Act' ("ESA"), as well as under international treaties, to prevent harm to threatened and endangered
species.' 82 All government agencies and officials are required to
ensure that activities under their control neither jeopardize the
or endangered species nor
continued existence of threatened
1 83
habitats.
their
modify
adversely

175. See Sandra Postel, Where Have All the Rivers Gone?, WORLD WATCH, MayJune 1995, at
176. See
177. See
178. See

9.
Glenn et al., supra note 174, at 817-18.
id.
id. at 817-18, 822-23.

179. See 50 C.F.R.
180.

§ 17.11 (1996).

See J.C. Barrera Guevara, The Conservation of Totoaba macdonaldi

(Gilbert), (Pisces:Sciaenidae),in the Gulf of California,37 J. FISH BIOLOGY 201, 201
(Supp. A), in THE BIOLOGY AND CONSERVATION OF RARE FISH (Alwyne Wheeler ed.,

1990) ("[D]iversion of the Colorado River has.., drastically alter[ed] the nursery
grounds of the totoaba.'); see also Frank Wilson, A Fish Out of Water: A Proposalfor
InternationalInstream Flow Rights in the Lower ColoradoRiver, 5 COLO.J. INT'L
ENvTL. L. & POLY 249, 253-55 (1994); cf. Miguel A. Cisneros-Mata et al., Life History
and Conservation of Totoaba macdonaldi, 9 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 806, 811-12

(1995) (concluding that although the effects of Colorado River control on the totoaba
have not been demonstrated, they should not be disregarded).
181.

16 U.S.C.A

§§

1531-1544 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).

182. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, as amended,
T.I.A.S. No. 11079 and Treaty Doc. No. 98-10 (1983).
183. See Endangered Species Act § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
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Recently, environmental groups have begun to express
concern for the delta and the upper gulf ecosystem. 184 In 1993,
the area was designated the Alto Golfo de California y Delta del
Rio Colorado Biosphere Reserve.' 8 5
Thus, environmental
advocates could assert that U.S. actions are destroying the
habitat of species south of the border, such as the totoaba, in
violation of the ESA.'8 6 In the future, Mexico may also object
based on the impacts of United States' actions on the biosphere
reserve as well as on endangered species and wetlands in Mexico.
Mexico similarly protested when excessive salinity in waters
delivered by the United States caused difficulties for Mexican
irrigators.'8 7
The United States would benefit from integrating international considerations into its decision processes. This is amply
demonstrated by the historic battle with Mexico over salinity and
its avoidable "surprises."'8 8 The United States first ignored the
issue and then adopted extraordinary measures to placate
Mexico. It is only a matter of time before legal or diplomatic
challenges will be made to the operating regime for the Colorado
River. By acting now to reverse environmental destruction, the
United States could avert these challenges and possible disruptions of its domestic uses of the Colorado River. Mexican
representatives thus could be engaged in problem-solving forums.
Binational efforts could lead to comprehensive study of the delta
and upper gulf region and an exploration of ways to implement
management approaches to supply additional Colorado River
waters needed for endangered species and wetland habitats.'8 9

184. See Glenn et al., supra note 174, at 818 n.4. See generally CONSERVATION
INTL, 1995/1996 GULF OF CALIFORNIA PROGRAM.
185. See U.S. MAN AND THE BIOSPHERE PROGRAM, BIOSPHERE RESERVES IN
ACTION: CASE STUDIES OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 44 (1995).

186. For a discussion of extraterritorial application of the ESA, see Wilson,
supranote 180, at 260-63 (arguing for such application to the totoaba). See generally
Scott A. Powell, Global Protection of Threatened and Endangered Species:
Rethinking Section 7 of the EndangeredSpecies Act, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 523
(1995) (recommending that the ESA should apply to federal agency action outside the
United States).
187. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
188. See supranotes 62-72 and accompanying text, and discussion, supraPart
I.C.2.
189. See generally Glenn et al., supra note 174.
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STIRRINGS OF COLLABORATION IN THE COLORADO RIVER
BASIN

Typically, the federal government has considered Colorado
River basin issues narrowly and without regard for all the
foreseeable consequences. At the same time, basin states have
competed for the right and ability to consume the river's resources. 190 However, there are notable exceptions.
The Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum (the
"Forum") is an example of interstate cooperation in problemsolving. After the CRBSCA was passed in 1974,191 the seven
basin states sought to implement it consistent with their obligations under the Clean Water Act. 9 ' They voluntarily formed the
Forum to pool their efforts and resources, to put together a plan
for satisfying the water quality standards under the Clean Water
Act, and to seek funding from Congress for the salinity control
program. 193 The Forum has furnished important advice to the
federal government regarding which projects should be pursued.
The basin states' cooperative efforts, however, have been limited
to addressing the single problem of salinity. Furthermore, Forum
membership is restricted to the states; other interested parties
have only the opportunity to appear at meetings and to address
9
the Forum.1'
Other cooperative efforts have emerged. For instance, water
marketing proposals have led to incipient cooperative efforts. The
federal government, states, and tribes have conducted a robust
debate about how to satisfy emerging needs by transferring water
allocations. 19 In addition, the strong mandate of the ESA has
induced various interests to cooperate in avoiding a freeze on
further water development in the basin.'" Further, the Adaptive
Management Work Group created to monitor and advise the
Secretary on Glen Canyon Dam operations is a remarkable
departure from the historically piecemeal approach to Colorado

190. See, e.g., supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
191. Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1571-1599 (1994).
192. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
193. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 14, at 31, 33-35; see also COLORADO RIVER
BASIN SALINITY CONTROL FORUM, supra note 169, at 1-2.
194. See COLORADO RIVER BASIN SALINITY CONTROL FORUM, supranote 169, at
1-2.
195. See infra Part II.A.
196. See supra Part I.C.1.
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River issues that the basin states have followed.197 These new
efforts at participatory problem-solving are resulting in more
cooperation and comprehensive treatment of river basin issues
than in the past. They may presage a wider approach to Colorado
River basin resource governance that could be institutionalized.
A.

Water Marketing Becomes Politically Correct

Economists have long urged that water rights be freely
traded to improve efficiency of use and natural resource conservation. 198 For a time, some basin interests resisted suggestions that
Colorado River water could be allocated by negotiated market
transactions, arguing that such transactions would be contrary to
the law of the river. 99 Their argument was made with special
force against proposals to market water across state lines,
because a complex web of compacts, laws, and treaties allocates
quantities of water among states. 00 But it appears that much of
the dogmatic resistance to marketing Colorado River water has
yielded to compelling practical arguments. States and water
users now realize that flexible uses of river water can be accommodated in market transactions. Even interstate markets appear
to be on the horizon.

197. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
198. See TERRY LEE ANDERSON, WATER CRISIS: ENDING THE POLICY DROUGHT
(1983); L.M. HARTMAN & DON SEASTONE, WATER TRANSFERS: ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
AND ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONS (1970); SCARCE WATER AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

9-11 (Kenneth D. Frederick ed., 1986); WATER AND AGRICULTURE IN THE WESTERN
U.S.: CONSERVATION, REALLOCATION, AND MARKETS (Gary D. Weatherford ed., 1982);
WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASS'N, WESTERN WATER: TUNING THE SYSTEM 51-56 (Bruce

Driver ed., 1986); David H. Getches, Water Use Efficiency: The Value of Water in the
West, 8 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1987); Charles W. Howe et al., Innovative Approaches
to Water Allocation: The Potentialfor Water Markets, 22 WATER RESOURCES RES. 439

(1986).
Commentators have discussed ways to make the use of markets compatible with
equitable and environmental concerns. See, e.g., SALIBA & BUSH, supra note 43;
Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, Moving Agricultural Water to Cities: The
Search for SmarterApproaches, HASTINGS WEST-NORTHWEST J. ENVTL. L. & POLY

27 (1994).
199. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON W. WATER MANAGEMENT, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST 240-41 (1992) (discussing negotiations
between Imperial Irrigation District ("IID') and Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California ("MWD")).
200. See David J. Guy, When the Law Dulls the Edge of Chance: Transferring
UpperBasin Water to the Lower ColoradoRiver Basin, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 25, 31-51.
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The seven basin states' positions on Colorado River water
marketing have sharply changed over the past ten years. In the
past, California water interests generally took the position that
any marketing or "sale" of Colorado River water was legally
impossible.2"' After years of posturing on both sides, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California ("MWD"), serving the
urbanized area from Los Angeles to San Diego, and the Imperial
Irrigation District ("IID"), serving large farms in the fertile desert
north of Mexico, eventually consummated a huge intrastate
exchange of Colorado River water. It was based on MWD's cash
payments to IID and physical improvements in the inefficient IID
system in return for the right to use the water conserved.2 "2
Although it was unmistakably a market transaction, the parties
assiduously avoided calling it that.20 3
In 1984, all the basin states adamantly opposed a private
interstate water transfer initiated by a private entrepreneur,
insisting that it was contrary to the law of the river.20 4 By 1991,
amidst a serious drought, California retreated from its antimarketing position and proposed an aggressive interstate water
marketing proposal.20 5 The other basin states roundly rejected
the California proposal.20 6 Then the Department of the Interior

201. See MARC REISNER & SARAH BATES, OVERTAPPED OASIS: REFORM OR
REVOLUTION FOR WESTERN WATER 154-59 (1990) (discussing negotiations and

eventual agreement between lID and MWD).
202. See id. at 158-62.
203. See id. at 156.
204. See Epilogue to NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER: MAJOR ISSUES
FOR THE NEXT CENTURY, supra note 6, at 225, 230; Sharon P. Gross, The Galloway
Projectand the Colorado River Compacts: Will the Compacts Bar Transbasin Water
Diversions?,25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 935, 959 (1985); Howard K. Holme, Obstacles to
Interstate Transfers of Water: Many a Slip 'Twixt the Cup and the Lip, in Natural
Resources Law Ctr., University of Colo. Sch. of Law, Tradition, Innovation and
Conflict: Perspectives on Colorado Water Law 267, 273 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell
ed., 1986); David Elliot Prange, Regional Water Scarcity and the Galloway Proposal,
17 ENVTL. L. 81, 83 (1985).

205. See California, Conceptual Approach for Reaching Basin States Agreement
on Interim Operation of Colorado River System Reservoirs, California's Use of
Colorado River Water Above Its Basic Apportionment, and Implementation of an
Interstate Water Bank (Aug. 28, 1991) (prepared for the Colorado River basin states
meeting in Denver, Colorado) [hereinafter Conceptual Approach] (on file with
author).
206. See California, Comments of the State of Colorado on the Conceptual
Approach for Reaching Basin States Agreement on Interim Operation of Colorado
River System Reservoirs, California's Use of Colorado River Water Above Its Basic

Apportionment, and Implementation of an Interstate Water Bank (Oct. 23, 1991) (on
file with author); Letter from D. Larry Andersen, Director, Utah Department of
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circulated proposed regulations that envisioned a water bank to
market some Colorado River water. Spurred on by this activity,
both Nevada and Arizona designed water banking proposals."'7
In 1994, Utah announced that it was prepared to lease water.2" 8
This rapid shift in the basin states' attitudes began in 1990.
Representatives of the seven basin states began meeting when
California anticipated that its demands for Colorado River water
could exceed the lower basin's allocation of 7.5 million acre-feet.2 9
For many years, California had consumed more than its apportionment of the Colorado River's water, but 1991 marked the first
year that the aggregate requests by the lower basin states
exceeded the entire lower basin's apportionment of 7.5 million
acre-feet.210 During the height of a five-year drought, California
requested the Secretary to deliver more water to the lower basin
than its basic allocation under the 1922 Compact.2 11 The four
upper basin states agreed to waive their objections to the Secretary's release of up to 400,000 acre-feet of additional water to
satisfy California's drought needs, provided that the seven states
would continue meeting to address how California would reduce
its future requests for Colorado River water. 1 2
Later in 1991, California presented a proposal under which
it would continue diverting the full capacity of the MWD pipeline

Natural Resources Division of Water Resources, to Gerald Zimmerman, Executive
Director, Colorado River Board of California 2 (Oct. 24, 1991) (on file with author);
Letter from Gordon W. Fassett, Wyoming State Engineer, to Gerald Zimmerman,
Executive Director, Colorado River Board of California 2 (Oct. 28, 1991) (on file with
author); Letter from Eluid L. Martinez, New Mexico State Engineer, to Gerald
Zimmerman, Executive Director, Colorado River Board of California 2 (Oct. 25, 1991)
(on file with author); Letter from Elizabeth Ann Rieke, Director, Arizona Department
of Water Resources, to Gerald Zimmerman, Executive Director, Colorado River Board
of California 1 (Oct. 23, 1991) (on file with author); Letter from Jack Stonehocker,
Director, Colorado River Commission of Nevada, to Gerald Zimmerman, Executive
Director, Colorado River Board of California 2-3 (Oct. 22, 1991) (on file with author).
207. See infra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., UtahRevives Water-Lease Possibility;ColoradoRiver Deal with
Las Vegas, Other Cities,Could Generate $20 Million a Year, ROCKY MTN. NEws, Nov.
17, 1994, at 34A.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 1; see also David E. Lindgren, The ColoradoRiver: Are New
ApproachesPossibleNow That the Reality of OverallocationIs Here?, 38 ROcKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 25-1, 25-27 (1992).
211. See MacDonnell, supra note 25, at 1-2.
212. See Letter from Wayne E. Cook, Executive Director, Upper Colorado River
Commission, to Gerald R. Zimmerman, Executive Director, Colorado River Board of
California (Jan. 31, 1991) (on file with author).
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(about 1.3 million acre-feet) and exceeding the state's annual
share, as it had for many years.213 In return, it offered to cut its
consumption back to its 4.4 million acre-feet allocation within
twenty years, and to make payments into an escrow account to
compensate for any water it consumed that caused the lower
214
basin's total consumption to exceed the Compact entitlement.
.California's proposal included a framework for an interstate
water bank that could temporarily redistribute states' rights to
use Colorado River water."' Although California, the only state
with unmet needs, presumably intended to be the primary
customer, users in any basin state could buy the water. Under
California's proposal, the water available through this market
would be limited according to a formula setting the maximum
amounts users could purchase. 1 ' A forum of the seven basin
states would fix the price of water.1 7
Basin states' responses to California's water bank proposal
were generally negative. 28 They raised legal, practical, and
economic problems, and none of the states suggested exploring
the concept further to solve those problems. Since only California
then used its-full apportionment of water, the other basin states
were all potential sellers of water to the bank, but the potential
economic rewards did not seem to tempt any of them. Perhaps
this was because the price suggested by an example in California's proposal was only $100 per acre-foot of water.219 However,
it is more likely that the basin states were focused on their
common ideal of having California reduce usage to its basic
Colorado River entitlement. This concern pervades the letters
and statements directed at California. 22 0 The other states' focus

213. See Conceptual Approach, supra note 205. California's proposal for water
banking went beyond the state's earlier, more modest suggestions that the MWD be
permitted to store water in an existing reservoir in years when it was not needed,
and then to extract it in later years. See Myron Holburt, Maximum Beneficial Use
of Colorado Sought, COLORADO RIVER AS'N NEWSLETTER, Spring 1983, at 2
(Colorado River Ass'n, L.A., Cal.).
214. See Conceptual Approach, supra note 205, at 13-15.
215. See id. at 15-19.
216. See id. at 17.
217. See id.
218. See sources cited supra note 206.
219. See Conceptual Approach, supra note 205, at D-3.
220. See sources cited supra note 206; see also Letter from Roy Romer, Governor
of Colorado, to Pete Wilson, Governor of California (Feb. 21, 1991) (on file with
author) (insisting that California limit future uses to no more than its entitlement).
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on reducing California's demands reflects their apparent insecurity about the durability and enforceability of the law of the river
if California were to remain dependent on water in excess of its
apportioned share. They were willing to let California use their
unused apportionments22 ' for free in the short-run but sought to
avoid allowing it to use the water in the long-run, even for a price.
Eventually, however, the advantages of profitable concessions to
California (or other states) became clearer to some basin states.
Later, both Nevada2 2 2 and Arizona 22 put forth their own

water bank proposals, which were limited to the lower basin
22
states.4
Arizona's proposal, the essentials of which became law
in 1996,22' enables the acquisition and sale of entitlements to use
water from the CAP 22 ' as well as any other water (not only from
the Colorado River) from tribes, irrigation districts, or farmers
with land fallowing programs. 227 Nevada's plan also proposed

authorizing a water bank to market water from any source, not
only water from the Colorado River.228 It even called for marketing previously unused entitlements to Colorado River water that
tribes and others hold under the law of the river.229 Nevada

221. Article III(e) of the Colorado River Compact, COLO.REV. STAT. § 37-61-101
(1990), states that if the lower basin has a use for water, the upper basin cannot
withhold water from the lower basin that the upper basin cannot reasonably apply
to domestic or agricultural uses. Thus, absent some banking or contractual
agreement, water would pass downstream to lower basin states with no
consideration in return.
222.

DIVISION

See COLORADO RIVER COMM'N OF NEVADA, NEVADA'S APPROACH TO A LOWER
NEVADA PROPOSAL];
REGIONAL SOLUTION (1994) [hereinafter

AMPLIFICATION OF NEVADA'S APPROACH TO A LOWER DMsION/BASIN REGIONAL

SOLUTION (1994) [hereinafter AMPLIFICATION OF NEVADA PROPOSAL].
223. See ARIZONA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, ARIZONA WATER BANK PROPOSAL
(1994) [hereinafter ARIZONA PROPOSAL].
224. See NEVADA PROPOSAL, supranote 222, at 3-4; ARIZONA PROPOSAL, supra
note 223, at 1-2.
225. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 45-2401 to -2472 (West Supp. 1996) (codifying
Arizona's water banking authority).
226. CAP was conceived in the 1940s to solve Arizona's groundwater overdraft
problem. The basic works, which were completed in 1986, pump water from the
Colorado River 2000 vertical feet and over two mountain ranges into Central
Arizona. The majority of water from the $4.4 billion project was to be delivered to
farmers for irrigation, but the cost of the water is prohibitively expensive. CAP now
operates at less than half of its capacity and delivers water mostly to cities for
municipal use. See REISNER, supra note 40, at 281-316. The CAP is authorized
under the Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1521 (1986).
227. See ARIZONA PROPOSAL, supra note 223, at 3.
228. See AMPLIFICATION OF NEVADA PROPOSAL, supra note 222, at 4-5.
229. See NEVADA PROPOSAL, supra note 222, at 3-4; see also Getches, supra note
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proposed that a lower basin commission be established; Arizona
created a state-controlled bank.23 ° Nevada attempted to address
the most apparent lower basin water needs: its own projected
demand for more water in Las Vegas, California's desire to
maintain full diversions to the MWD, and Arizona's insecurity
about future supplies.2"' Arizona's proposed bank seems to be a
defensive measure intended to exert as complete state control as
possible over its unused entitlements to the Colorado River and
over potential transfers of Colorado River water. Both states'
proposals had provisions to mitigate the impacts from the water
bank transactions, including local economic problems and
environmental harms from transferring water out of areas of
origin.232 Nevada's proposal, however, required state legislation
and special rules promulgated by the Secretary, neither of which
was forthcoming.2 3
To date, only Arizona has implemented a water bank.2" 4 The
version enacted by the Arizona legislature effectively subsidizes
farmers by providing them with imported Colorado River water,
which they could not otherwise afford because of the charges for
CAP deliveries.3 The farmers can then reduce their pumping
from wells so that aquifers will not be depleted, conserving
groundwater for future uses in years when Arizona does not or
1, at 472-77 (discussing legal and policy obstacles to water marketing on the
Colorado River). The explicit inclusion of unused entitlements distinguishes
Nevada's proposal from others. The absence of such provisions from other proposals

suggests that their drafters may presume that non-users (like many tribes who lack
delivery facilities) cannot withhold water, and thus that there is no point in
downstream users paying them not to use or withhold the water. This position is
short-sighted as well as inequitable to those who have not developed their water.
Requiring that a party invest in diversion facilities and use the water for a time,
even an instant, in order to make it marketable, is a formality that simply increases

the seller's sunk costs, thus reducing profits or increasing price, or a combination of
both.
230.

See NEVADA PROPOSAL, supranote 222, at 3-4; ARIZONA PROPOSAL, supra

note 223, at 1.
231. See NEVADA PROPOSAL, supra note 222, at 1-2.
232. See NEVADA PROPOSAL, supranote 222, at 3-4; AMPLIFICATION OF NEVADA
PROPOSAL, supra note 222, at 11-12; ARIZONA PROPOSAL, supra note 223, at 7.

233. See NEVADA PROPOSAL, supra note 222, at 2.
234. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 45-2401 to -2472 (West Supp. 1996). The Secretary

has promised to promulgate the regulations necessary to allow operation of federal
facilities consistent with water banking operations. See Bruce Babbitt, Address to
Colorado River Water Users Ass'n (Dec. 19, 1996) [hereinafter Babbitt Address] (on
file with author).
235. See Meeting the Challenge: Arizona's Water Recovery, WATER STRATEGIST,
Fall 1995, at 3, 8-9.
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cannot take its full entitlement from the Colorado River.3 6
Though the profitability of the scheme is uncertain, the bank
provides Arizona with a means of selling its unneeded water to
Nevada and California in the future, possibly at prices sufficient
to recoup its expenditures. 23 7 Arizona's legislature rationalized
the considerable cost of the program as a way of depriving
California of the water that it would (and legally could) take if
Arizona did not find a use for it. The program was thus intended
to force California to solve its chronic problem of using more
water from the river than its basic entitlement.2 8
Another water bank proposal was made by a group of ten
Indian tribes, the Colorado River Basin Tribes Partnership.2 9
Beginning in 1992, the basin states admitted representatives of
the tribal partnership to some of their meetings. These joint
gatherings were called "7-10 meetings" after the seven states and
236. See Arizona Water Banking,

WESTERN STATES WATER NEWSLETTER

(Western States Water Council, Midvale, Utah), Jan. 31, 1997, at 2.

237. See Meeting the Challenge: Arizona's Water Recovery, supra note 235, at
20.
238. See Arizona Water Banking, supra note 236, at 2 (quoting Rita Pearson,
Director of Arizona's Department of Water Resources, as saying, ' The creation of the
Arizona Water Bank should send a loud wake-up call to California.. . .'). The first
year's appropriation of $9.4 million seems like an expensive message to send to

California. See Arizona Water Banking Authority Will Bank 436,000 AF in 1997,
WATER INTELLIGENCE MONTHLY, Nov. 1996, at 4. It is difficult to justify the cost of

the program to the state as necessary for the conservation of groundwater that may
be needed in the future even as it makes relatively expensive CAP water available
for low-valued agricultural uses. In any event, state law contemplates phasing out
overdrafts through planned depletion of the aquifer until 2025. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 45-562(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 1996). Agricultural uses may continue under
existing rights until then. See Robert Jerome Glennon, 'Because That's Where the

Water Is" Retiring Current Water Uses to Achieve the Safe-Yield Objective of the
Arizona GroundwaterManagementAct, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 89, 90-91 (1991).
If Arizona faced a serious likelihood of having its entitlement of Colorado River
water curtailed and actually needed to use its full entitlement, perhaps this
extraordinary expense could be justified as insurance. Arizona is vulnerable to
cutbacks in a severe, sustained drought because it was required to subordinate its
rights to CAP water to California's rights as a condition of getting the federal
government to build the project. See 43 U.S.C. § 1521(b) (1994). However, the
possibility of a reduction in deliveries in the short run is small; it would be likely
only in extreme circumstances. See MacDonnell et al., supra note 16, at 829
(recognizing that Arizona and the upper basin would suffer the consequences of a
severe, sustained drought because the lower basin has a higher priority).
It would seem far more rational simply to agree that California (and eventually
Nevada) can take Arizona's unused entitlement for a period of years in exchange for
payments to Arizona.
239. See Position Paper of the Ten Tribes with Water Rights in the Colorado
River Basin, supra note 113, at 2.
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ten tribes who attended. 4 ' The admission of the tribes to the
states' deliberations was historic. Their admission makes it less
likely that tribes can be excluded from discussions that affect
their interests in the future.2 4' Their inclusion in discussions
with the states has increased the tribes' awareness of the states'
needs for additional water and has presented an opportunity for
the tribes to offer states some of their presently available tribal
water.
The Colorado River Basin Tribes Partnership proposed a
water bank that would draw on a variety of sources-the tribes'
unused entitlements as well as tribal water freed-up by land
fallowing and other conservation measures-for marketing to
non-Indians who need it. 2 The tribes' proposal actually suggests
two banks, one for the upper basin and one for the lower basin,24
recognizing the different attitudes in the states of the two subbasins.24 4
Both the Arizona and the Nevada banking proposals were
motivated by the Bureau of Reclamation's publication of two
proposed sets of progressively detailed and aggressive water
marketing regulations for the lower Colorado River.245 Effectively
the "watermaster" for allocating and administering water
controlled by federal facilities on the river, the Secretary circulated the first set of proposed regulations in 1991, signaling his
intention to promote market transfers of water.2 46 The proposal
was limited to intrastate transactions among water contractors
240. See MacDonnell, supranote 25, at 24.
241. Apparently the states do continue to meet without including the tribes.
See, e.g., Water Resources/WaterRights; California/ColoradoRiver Basin,WESTERN
STATES WATER NEWSLETTER (Western States Water Council, Midvale, Utah), Sept.
1996.

242. See Colorado River Basin Tribes Partnership, Proposed Fundamental
Components of Colorado River Water Marketing/Banking (Oct. 11, 1994) (on file With
author).
243. See id.
244. See supra sources cited notes 206, 212.
245. See MacDonnell, supra note 25, at 29.
246. See Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Proposed
Regulations for Administering Entitlements to Colorado River Water in the Lower
Colorado River Basin (1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1991 Proposed
Regulations]. The 1991 draft was informally circulated for comment, but was not
officially published to initiate rulemaking.
The transfer provisions expanded on the Bureau's general policy statement in
1987, which said it would facilitate water transfers among willing buyers and sellers.
See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ASSESSMENT 87... A NEW
DIRECTION FOR THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 5 (1987) [hereinafter ASSESSMENT 87].
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in the three lower basin states24 7 and included major new
requirements for water contractors. 248 As a whole, the proposed
regulations attracted less criticism than they would have if
attention had not been diverted by California's drought.249
The 1991 draft regulations did not address the contemporary
drought situation. At roughly the same time that they were
released, the Bureau of Reclamation circulated a discussion paper
suggesting how lower basin facilities could be used to facilitate a
"water bank. 250 The paper thus offered a modest, practical
approach to the drought problem. It paled next to California's
more ambitious conceptual approach, which had just been
circulated. For instance, the Bureau's proposed bank would
simply allow states to accumulate credits for unused shares of the
lower basin entitlement that could be transferred among the
lower basin states. 2 1 California proposed a seven-state commission for the whole basin and enabled freer marketing of water.252
Consequently, the basin states focused their attention and
criticism on California's initiative.
In 1994, the Bureau of Reclamation circulated informational
copies of a set of proposed regulations that were far more detailed
than the 1991 draft.253 Building on the earlier draft, the regulations included a more elaborate proposal for a lower basin water
bank that expanded the realm of market transactions and the
sources of water. The regulations also extended use of the water
247. See 1991 Proposed Regulations, supranote 246, §415.1.
8.The draft covered a variety of issues related to water
248. See id. §§ 415.7, -.
contracts; it stated that unused, or not beneficially used, contract rights would be
lost; it demanded conservation plans as required by the Reclamation Reform Act of
1982; it dealt with tributary groundwater pumping; it set requirements for wheeling
non-project water through the system; and it defined the terms to be included in
several types of contracts involving the Bureau (including contracts for surplus

water).
249. But see Rules of the River: BuRec's Proposed Regulations for the Lower
Colorado, WATER STRATEGIST, Fall 1991, at 1 (lengthy analysis and criticism of
proposed rules).
250. See Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Lower Colorado
River Basin: Water Banking Concept for Colorado River Water Discussion Paper
(Oct. 4, 1991) (on file with author).
251. See 1991 Proposed Regulations, supra note 246, § 415.11.
252. See Conceptual Approach, supra note 205, at 10.
253. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Proposed Regulations
of Administering Entitlements to Colorado River Water in the Lower Colorado River
Basin (May 6, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1994 Proposed Regulations].
These were not published as part of actual rulemaking but were designed to
stimulate comment and discussion.
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bank to facilitate interstate water sales 2" among the three lower
basin states and set rules for off-reservation leasing and banking
of rights to use conserved tribal water.2 5" To comport with the
Arizona v. California decree that charges water "consumptively
used" by a state to its apportionment,5 ' the regulations also
provided that conserved water placed in the bank for use by
others was effectively consumed by the selling state. Finally, the
proposed regulations declared that banked water is free from the
priorities of the law of the river and of state water law.25 7
A few months after the release of the second set of proposed
federal regulations, the three lower basin states and the Bureau
of Reclamation formed a so-called Technical Committee to discuss
the issues raised by the Bureau's proposal. 5 s In June 1995, after
several meetings, the Technical Committee issued a final
report.5 9 The Technical Committee rejected the concept of
marketing unused entitlements, which Nevada and the tribes had
embraced. Nor was the Technical Committee quite ready for
tribal off-reservation water leasing, which appeared variously in
the proposals advanced by the Bureau of Reclamation, Arizona,
Nevada, and the tribes; its report conceded only that tribal offreservation leasing could be "phased in" over time. Much of the
report dealt with truly technical aspects of water banking."e The
254. See id. § 415.23(0.
255. See id. §§ 415.8(d)(3), -.23(d)(5). The regulations presumed that sales of
Indian water did not require the consent or approval of Congress. There is an issue
whether such sales constitute an interest in real property that is subject to the
Indian Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994). See David H. Getches,
Management and Marketing of Indian Water: From Conflict to Pragmatism,58 U.
CoLO.L. REv. 515, 542 (1988).
256. 1994 Proposed Regulations, supranote 253, § 415.23(h). The regulations
anticipated that users could free up water for sale by "extraordinary" conservation
efforts and land fallowing. Id. § 415.23(d)(2).
257. See id. § 415.23(h). By freeing the water of these priorities, the Secretary
would treat it as a commodity that he could store and release from the reservoirs
without entities that are entitled to water under the law of the river, claiming a right
to it. It would, however, have to be released to make space for flood waters. See id.
§ 415.23(e). So that these flood releases would not count against those with priorities
under the law of the river, the banked water would be considered the first water
released for flood control. This is called "top water" banking.
258. See Colorado River Lower Basin Technical Committee, Progress Report 1
(Oct. 11, 1994) (on file with author).
259. Lower Colorado River Basin Technical Committee, Progress Report No. 4,
at 4 (June 1, 1995) (on file with author); see also Troubled River, WATER STRATEGIST,
Spring 1995, at 1, 5, 16.
260. The report suggested different classes of storage for banked water, defining
the security of storage and timing of releases according to water source. The
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Technical Committee thus skirted the important questions of
conflict resolution and avoidance, long-range planning, and policy
matters. It is remarkable, nevertheless, that the Technical
Committee implicitly agreed to the idea of interstate water
marketing, found there was nothing unlawful about marketing
unused entitlements, though it did not favor them, and suggested
that off-reservation leasing of tribal water might eventually be
acceptable.
Nearly all the water banking proposals that have been
offered involve interstate water transactions, and, as discussed
above, a majority of basin states have at least shown interest in
the concept. Moreover, formerly solid upper basin state resistance to interstate water marketing was broken when Utah
informally but publicly proposed marketing-even to the lower
basin-its right to consume up to 100,000 acre-feet of Colorado
River water per year for a price of $200 per acre-foot.261 The
potential economic advantage from such schemes suggests that
it is only a matter of time before interstate water marketing
becomes acceptable to the other three upper basin states. In
addition to the economic incentive for them to participate, they
would gain the security of having purchasing states confirm the
legal viability of the upper basin's unused apportionments. That
confirmation is implicit in any lease or other transaction involving paid consideration for use of another state's apportioned
water.
By gaining security through leasing, upper basin states can
fulfill a purpose of the 1922 Compact. Slower growing states
pursued the Compact as a way to preserve shares of Colorado
River water to meet the needs of future generations of their
citizens.262 A state seeking to lease water must be cautious, of
course, that it does not lease water for out-of-state uses for such

committee also dealt with how to account for water inadvertently used in excess of
entitlements. Determination of when a "surplus" exists, which is an important issue
for reservoir operation, also occupied the committee's attention. See Lower Colorado
River Basin Technical Committee, supra note 259, at 3-8; see also infra notes 368-74
and accompanying text.
261. See Jim Woolf, Leasing Water May Help Utah Cash Flow Liquid Assets:
Utah May Lease Its Water, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 16, 1994, at Al. Ted Stewart, the
Executive Director of Utah's Department of Water Resources, suggested that Utah
explore the concept of leasing water to Las Vegas, as the concept would enable Utah
to raise about $20 million per year. See id.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
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a long period that it will lack water to meet its future demands
during the lease term.
A state may risk having sufficient water in the future if it
failed to control private interstate water marketing. In the 1980s,
the Galloway Group, owned by an out-of-state entrepreneur,
proposed to sell water developed under Colorado rights to users
in the lower basin."' With the support of26 other
basin states,
4
Colorado successfully resisted the proposal.
A variant of the Galloway proposal re-emerged a few years
later under the sponsorship of the Resource Conservation Group,
Inc. (RCG). Attempting to overcome the political discredit that
the Galloway Group had suffered, RCG claimed the backing of
several influential citizens of the basin states.26 5 It offered
refinements and advantages over the Galloway Group's original
plan. The Galloway Group had proposed building reservoirs to
store water under its acquired water rights before shipping it to
San Diego under lease to the regional water supplier. In contrast,
RCG would acquire contractual rights from farmers to curtail
uses of water periodically, paying them for the right to curtail and
for any consumptive uses actually foregone. RCG also proposed
to pay into a fund for each upper basin state whose water could
be used for future water development.2 6 RCG's scheme was
complicated, however, by also purporting to market undeveloped
water (that is, water not now used consumptively in the upper
basin).2 7 Like its predecessor, the RCG proposal did not advance.
In 1993, oil companies, which had excess rights to Colorado
water after the collapse of the anticipated market for shale oil,
promoted another export idea. They proposed to develop, store,
and release their Colorado River water for uses in Nevada.26 8 The

263. See Guy, supra note 200, at 26-27; Prange, supra note 204, at 82.
264. See Epilogue to NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER: MAJOR ISSUES
FOR THE NEXT CENTURY, supra note 6, at 225, 230; see also Guy, supra note 200, at
26-27; Prange, supra note 204, at 83-84; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Interstate
Transfers: Sporhase, Compacts, and Free Markets, C616 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 79 (1991);
Sergio J. Viscoli, The Resource ConservationGroupProposalto Lease ColoradoRiver
Water, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 887, 890 (1991).
265. See Viscoli, supra note 264, at 890. Former Arizona Governor, now
Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt was among those reportedly backing the
proposal.
266. Id. at 890-92.
267. Id. at 896-99.
268. See Ex-Governor Is New Hired Gun Behind Proposalto Sell Water, ROCKY
MTN. NEWS, Aug. 4, 1994, at 30A; Jennifer Gavin & Adriel Bettelheim, Western
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idea was officially opposed,2 69 but apparently it has not been
withdrawn.
A special problem could arise if private appropriators market
water out-of-state in unlimited quantities for an undefined term.
The Interstate Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
limits the states' restrictions on water marketing.
However, states have constitutional means to prevent a private
water rights holder from defeating a state's legitimate interest in
water allocated to the state by interstate compact. For example,
a state can impose even-handed limitations on the appropriation,
use, and change of use of water that apply to in- and out-of-state
uses. 7 1 All of the basin states except Colorado have administrative procedures and public interest criteria for screening water
rights applications and changes of use that allow them to assert
and protect their legitimate interests. 2
Perhaps because of
Colorado's lack of a process to assert the public's interest in
Colorado's waters for present or future public benefits, 7 ' entre-

Water Showdown; Open ColoradoMarket Feared,DENV. POST, Sept. 18, 1994, at Al;
Las Vegas Eyes Coloradofor Water; Officials Call Roan Creek Reservoira Short-Term
Source for Booming City, ROCKY MTN. NEws, Sept. 18, 1994, at 26A.
269. See Don't Bet the Farm on Planto Lease Water to Las Vegas, DENV. POST,
Feb. 13, 1993, at 7B; Bob Ewegen, Love Note from Coloradoto the Boycotters in L.A.:
Drink Sand and Die, DENV. POST, Mar. 29, 1993, at 7B.
270. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
271. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694, 708 (D.N.M. 1984)
(holding that a New Mexico statute that applied conservation and public welfare
criteria equitably to in- and out-of-state water transactions would pass constitutional
muster). Furthering the purposes of a congressionally approved interstate compact
also would appear to be a legitimate motivation for state legislation. Cf. Intake
Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 590 F. Supp. 293, 297 (D. Mont.
1983) (stating that Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce and that
its approval of an interstate compact restricting exports without state consent is
immune from attack).
272. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45.152 to -155 (West 1994); CAL. WATER CODE
§ 105 (West 1971); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 533.030, 533.324-.435 (Michie 1995);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-1, 72-5-5 to -7 (Michie 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-3-1, 733-8 (1989); WYO. CONST. art. 8, § 3. Of course these criteria and procedures cannot
become a subterfuge for restraining commerce. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 954-58 (1982). Sporhase allows for constitutionally
permissible restrictions. See id. at 958-60.
273. Colorado has made two attempts to assert the state's interest in interstate
water markets. Colorado's first attempt requires a finding of the water court that
the export be credited against interstate water compact delivery obligations to other
states or not conflict with the state's ability to comply with those requirements. See
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37.81-101(3)(a) (1996). Further, the export must be consistent
with the reasonable conservation of Colorado's resources, see § 37-81-101(3)(b), and
must not deprive Colorado users of beneficial uses of waters that are apportioned to
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preneurs have targeted several schemes to develop and export
water on sources in that state.2 74 Until Colorado enacts controls
on water uses that preserve its interest in waters allocated by
interstate compacts, it must rely on blanket arguments against
the legality of all such interstate or interbasin water marketing
to prevent improvident interstate sales by enterprising private
appropriators.
The legal objections to interstate water markets (including
interbasin markets between states in the upper and lower basins)
are not insurmountable.2 7' Nevertheless, legal challenges by any

Colorado. See § 37-81-101(3)(c). To comply with these requirements, the applicant
must demonstrate that the export will be accounted for as a credit to Colorado's
compact delivery requirements. See § 37-81-103(1),(2). Section 37-81-103 would
presumably lead to denial of the application if and when Colorado approached the
limits of its compact share. In any event, this process gives Colorado little effective
control. The state is now using only about 1.994 million of a possible 3.079 million
acre-feet per year of Colorado River water. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T
OF THE INTERIOR, CONSUMPTIVE USES AND LOSSES REPORT 1981-1985 (June 1991) (on
file with author); Colorado River Compact Water Development Work Group, Final
Report: Colorado River Compact Water Development Projection of Endangered Fish
Flow (Nov. 2, 1995). Therefore one million acre-feet of Colorado's compact
entitlement can be marketed in the sole discretion of private appropriators before instate beneficial uses are impaired. If the state attempted to enforce the provision
against an exporting appropriator for excessive exports, there likely would be a
challenge to the constitutionality of this provision under Sporhase. See supra note
272. Because the very purpose of the Colorado River compacts was to ensure that
upper basin states could enjoy the future beneficial use of water, a judicious
application of this provision to protect existing beneficial uses would probably be
upheld. See supra notes 46-48.
Colorado's second attempt to assert its interest in compact water by controlling
interstate water markets was to pass a law taxing transfers of water to out-of-state
(but not to in-state) uses. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-81-104(1) (1996). However, the
state attorney general has opined that this would be unconstitutional because it
violates the interstate commerce clause. See Op. Colo. Att'y Gen. No. 850 4066/AON
(1985). In any event, the tax is a mere $50 per acre-foot, which is small
compensation to the state and the public for the resource and little inhibition to the
seller in a market where the exporter is likely to charge many times that amount.
See § 37-81-104(1).
274. See supra notes 263-69 and accompanying text.
275. The interstate compacts do not directly bar interstate water marketing,
although their terms reflect that it was not within the contemplation of the
negotiators. See Getches, supra note 1, at 475. The key requirement of the Colorado
River Compact is that the upper basin states deliver 75 million acre-feet of water to
Lee Ferry every 10 years (art. III(d)), as well as the upper basin's portion called for
the U.S.-Mexican Treaty requirement (art. III(c)). See Colorado River Compact of
1922, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-61-101 (1990); US-Mexico Treaty, supra note 2. The
Compact makes it necessary to account for whether a sale from an upper to a lower
basin party is considered within or outside the minimum delivery requirement, but
it should not otherwise impede such transfers. Sales from lower to upper basin
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state could delay and complicate interstate transactions. Thus,
it would be wise to obtain the consent of all basin states based on
reasonable consideration, monetary or otherwise.
B. Endangered Species Act Recovery Plans Bring Diverse
Interests Together
1.

Upper Basin

Interests in the upper Colorado River basin engaged in one
of the first efforts in the nation to reach a consensus on how to
comply with the ESA. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (the
"Service") issued a "jeopardy opinion"276 concluding that further
depletions of the upper Colorado River would jeopardize the
continued existence of several species of fish that are indigenous

parties, which are less likely because demand is higher in the lower basin, would
contradict the Compact's terms if they resulted in too little water being delivered.
The most substantial legal objection that can be raised against interstate water
marketing is a potential inhibition on the delivery to users in a lower basin state that
results in different apportionments from the 1964 Decree in Arizona v. California,
which sets the terms for the Secretary's releases for facilities on the river. See
Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 343 (1964). Article II(B)(4) of the decree states
that "mainstream water consumptively used within a State shall be charged to its
apportionment, regardless of the purpose for which it was released." Id. The decree,
which is framed as an injunction, also says that the three lower basin states and
named water users in California are enjoined "[flrom consuming or purporting to
authorize the consumptive use of water from the mainstream in excess of the
quantities permitted under Article II." Id. at 347. The water also must be delivered
pursuant to valid contracts with the Secretary. See id.; see also Memorandum from
Karen L. Tachiki, Gary D. Weatherford, and William H. Swan to the Technical
Committee (Sept. 7, 1995) (on file with author) (examining the legal framework for
interstate transfers within the lower basin). The provisions of Article II of the decree
would apply to water transferred from one lower basin state to another, or from an
upper to a lower basin state. Legal challenges to transfers presumably could be
forestalled by appropriate secretarial regulations and contracts designed to facilitate
transfers that are adopted without a lower basin objection. Any such objection could
be resolved by a litigated decision or a stipulation of the parties approved by the
court under Arizona v. California. Regulations would also have to cover reservoir
operations and releases consistent with the Colorado River Basin Project Act,
discussed infra Part III.A.2 and Part B.2.b.
276. Section 7 of the ESA requires all federal agencies to consult with the Fish
and Wildlife Service ("Service") about whether an agency action is likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of a listed species or its habitat. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4)
(1994). If, after this consultation, the Service issues a biological opinion that the
proposed federal action is likely to jeopardize the species, then the Service must also
suggest what reasonable and prudent alternatives can be taken to avoid the
likelihood of jeopardy. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (1994).
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to the river.2 77 The Service considered a plan to prevent new
depletions and attempted to restore the river's flows to levels that
existed many years earlier."' Because federal actions, such as
approvals of water projects, are prohibited if they would jeopardize an endangered species, 279 Colorado officials were concerned
about the impact of the jeopardy opinion and doubted the efficacy
of the Service's approach. Colorado therefore initiated discussions with the Service in 1984. The agency then agreed to meet
with a group of interested parties to discuss the issues. That
meeting led to a multi-interest, multi-state working group and
the establishment of a parallel technical group.28 The working
group grew to include representatives of Colorado, Utah, and
Wyoming, water users' organizations, power distributors; three
federal agencies, and, later in the process, environmental groups.
After long negotiations, in 1987 the group agreed to an endangered fishes recovery program."
The major program to mitigate some of the impacts of dams
and water diversions began in 1988 with the goal of recovering
the Colorado River's endangered species of fish within fifteen
years.28 2 Measures to accomplish that goal included releasing
23
water from federal dams to mimic seasonal flow patterns,
2 84
providing for flows through state instream flow programs,
restoring stream channels and wetlands, 5 building fish passages
at major diversion structures, 286 controlling competing non-native
fish, 7 stocking endangered fish reared in hatcheries,"' research-

277. See Robert Wigington & Dale Pontius, Toward Range.Wide Integrationof
Recovery ImplementationProgramsfor the EndangeredFishes of the ColoradoRiver,
in THE COLORADO RIVER WORKSHOP: ISSUES, IDEAS, AND DIRECTIONS, supranote 11,
at 43, 50.
278. See id.; see also Getches, supra note 1, at 447.
279. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
280. See RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM, supra note 153.
281. See id. at 1-1.
282. See FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REVISED
RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FOR ENDANGERED FISH SPECIES IN THE UPPER
COLORADO RIVER BASIN 3 (1994) (on file at the Bureau of Reclamation, Region Six,
Denver, Colo.).
283. See id. at 5.
284. See id. at 5-7.
285. See id. at 8.
286. See id. at 8-9.
287. See id. at 9-10.
288. See id. at 10-11.
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ing further improvements,28 9 and monitoring.29 0 Costs of the
program are paid mostly from federal hydropower revenues and
from congressional appropriations to the Service and the Bureau
of Reclamation.29 1 From a water developer's perspective, the
program is beneficial because it may allow new dams and
diversions to proceed. 2 Today, the plan has support from all the
parties to the negotiation. They have collaborated on developing
the plan and they are generally supportive of efforts seeking to
fund and implement it effectively.
2.

Lower Basin Multi-Species Conservation Program

In 1994, the Service designated critical habitat for four
endangered fishes in the lower Colorado River basin.2 93 In
response, representatives of Arizona, California, and Nevada,
together with various water and power agencies, formed a
regional partnership to develop a program to protect threatened
and endangered species of fish and wildlife and their habitats. 9 4
The program covers the mainstream of the lower Colorado River
from Glen Canyon Dam to the international boundary with
Mexico.2 95 In all, the program aims to protect more than 100
federal- and state-listed species, candidate species, and sensitive
species and their associated298habitats through a comprehensive,
ecosystem-based approach.

289. See id. at 11-12.
290. See id. at 11-12.
291. See Wigington & Pontius, supra note 277, at 56.
292. See Tom Pitts, Colorado River Fish Recovery Program Benefits Water
Users, COLORADO WATER RIGHTS, Summer 1995, at 5.
293. See 50 C.F.R. pt. 17 (1994).
294. See Wigington & Pontius, supra note 277, at 64.
295. See id.
296. Participants in the program include the Service, Bureau of Reclamation,
National Park Service, Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Arizona Department of Water Resources, Arizona Department of Game and Fish,
Colorado River Board of California, California Department of Fish and Game,
Colorado River Commission of Nevada, Nevada Division of Wildlife, Lower Colorado
Indian Tribes, and various water and hydroelectric power resource management
agencies within the three lower basin states. The program is also seeking
participation by a broad array of conservation groups. They have been reluctant to
participate because they were excluded from the conceptual phases and the process
was broadened only after litigation over the exclusiveness of the process seemed
inevitable. See Lower Colorado Multispecies Conservation Program Agreement
Between the U.S. Department of the Interior and the Lower Colorado River
Multispecies Conservation Program Steering Committee (June 22, 1996) (on file with
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The federal, state, and power-producing entities signed a
Memorandum of Agreement29 7 ('MOA") to develop the species
conservation program on August 2, 1995. The MOA set a threeyear period for development of a multi-species conservation plan
('MSCP"). It further provided that the Service and the Bureau of
Reclamation work with the parties to meet the requirements of
the ESA while accommodating interim water diversion and power
needs.2 9 For a time, planning activities were stalled. Environmental organizations objected to delaying ESA section 7 consultation on the effects of lower Colorado River operations on endangered species, and power organizations hesitated to commit to the
program without a federal agreement to share costs. The parties
resolved those issues and decided to invite participation by
environmental representatives who earlier had been left out of
the discussions. 99
In May 1997 the Secretary of the Interior approved a
proposal emerging from the process. A $4.5 million study will be
conducted over five years, thus extending the time for developing
the multi-species plan. The plan would guide river operations
over a 50-year period and in a way that accommodates economic
needs and protects 102 species of rare plants and animals."' 0
C.

The Adaptive Management Work Group

When the Secretary of the Interior implemented a new plan
for operating the Glen Canyon Dam in 1996, he created an entity
to monitor the plan and to recommend modifications in it."' This

author).
297. See id.
298. See id. at 1-2.
299. See Memorandum from General Manager to Board of Directors, MWD of
Southern California, on the Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation
Program (Aug. 6, 1996) (on file with author). The objections have been addressed in
a Memorandum of Clarification ('MOC'). The MOC reaffirmed the goals of
conserving habitat, recovery of listed species, and prevention of additional species
within the 100-year floodplain of the lower Colorado River from being listed pursuant
to the ESA. It reiterated the commitment to accommodate current water diversion
and power production, and to optimize opportunities for future water and power
development with immediate section 7 consultations. The Department of the
Interior also agreed to split the costs of the program equally between the federal
government and the states. See id.
300. Steve Yozwiak, Southwest River PlanCriticized, THE ARiz. REPUBLIC, May
6, 1997, at Al.
301. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.

1997]

COLORADO RIVER GOVERNANCE

was a revolutionary step in two respects. First, it employs the
relatively new concept of adaptive management and second, it
involves more diverse interests in Colorado River decisionmaking
than ever before. The Secretary constituted an Adaptive Management Work Group to monitor progress, assist in coordinating
technical information, and recommend mid-course adjustments
in Glen Canyon operations.0 2
The process of adaptive management allows decisions to be
modified as experience warrants. 03 It admits the realities of an
uncertain milieu of changing natural conditions, multiple
variables, and uncertain data. Based on its monitoring of how
well the Secretary's criteria are working, the Group is expected
periodically to propose modified operating criteria.
While major decisions concerning Glen Canyon Dam operations will be subject to a higher level of public input, it remains
unclear how and to what extent the Group will be consulted in
other matters relating to Colorado River operation and policy.
Glen Canyon Dam operations affect other issues of public
importance on the Colorado River like salinity control, reallocation of consumptive water rights among basin states, and
endangered species protection. Similarly, each of those issues
cannot be addressed without considering Glen Canyon operations.
Although the purposes of the Group that grew out of the Glen
Canyon Dam EIS process are limited,"° adaptive management is

302. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
303. For a discussion of the theory of adaptive management, see KAI N. LEE,
COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE 53-55 (1993).
304. When the Glen Canyon Dam EIS was initiated, it appeared to be designed
to consider a range of operational changes to be reflected in the LROC, or the annual
operating plans, or both, and it dealt with all the complicated issues of operating a
major dam with lucrative hydroelectric power-generating capacity at the head of the
Grand Canyon consistent with the entire law of the river. In the meantime,
Congress passed the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, requiring that the
Secretary operate the dam to protect the cultural and natural values of Grand
Canyon National Park. See Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102575, § 1804, 106 Stat 4669. When the EIS was complete, the Secretary decided to
prepare a set of operating criteria (separate from the LROC) specifically to respond
to the Grand Canyon Protection Act. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
INTERIOR, OPERATING CRITERIA FOR GLEN CANYON DAM IN ACCORDANCE WITH GRAND
CANYON PROTECTION ACT OF 1992 (1997).
Furthermore, the Charter for the
Adaptive Management Work Group can be read to limit its advisory role to those
criteria and not to the Secretary's broader decisionmaking functions that impact the
issues covered in the EIS. See supra note 147. Tying the Group's role to the Act
could be unnecessarily limiting, even as to the operations of Glen Canyon Dam,
depending on the degree to which the Secretary is or is not willing to hear the Group
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a concept that could be more broadly considered in planning for
basin-wide management and in implementing LROC and the
3
annual operating plans for all dams in the system. 0
An entity comparable to the Glen Canyon Adaptive
Management Work Group is needed to influence the Secretary's
determination of five-year operating criteria for all Colorado
River facilities and the annual operating plans that are adopted
to implement the five-year criteria. Such a group could help
ensure that the public is fairly and appropriately included in
decisions that affect them, and it could help to guide the
sustainable use of basin resources. Perhaps the Glen Canyon
Adaptive Management Group can be a model for more inclusive
decisionmaking on issues throughout the basin.
III.

MOVING TOWARD BASIN GOVERNANCE BY SHARING
FEDERAL AUTHORITY

In the past, the Secretary has been patient and deferential,
assuming that once problems were identified, the basin states
would be motivated by self-interest to resolve them. This
approach has produced only limited results. Unless the states act
rapidly and use processes that include participation by other
affected interests, the Secretary should take more decisive action.
The legal authority exists for the Secretary to step in and
supplant the states and other interests. There is, however, an
option that lies between the laissez-faire approach of the past and
wholesale preemption of the decisionmaking process. It is for the
Secretary to provide inducements to move the states and others
toward comprehensive, inclusive decisions that are the product of
the full range of affected interests.
The Secretary should promote cooperative approaches to the
problems of the Colorado River basin by assigning selected tasks
to a representative group of basin interests. Following a review
of the basis for the Secretary's authority, this section identifies
five areas that are ripe for immediate secretarial action. Each
on broader questions.
305. The Group includes one representative from each of five federal agencies,
the Arizona Game and Fish Department, six tribes, seven states, and two
representatives each from environmental groups, recreation interests, and federal
power contractors. All are appointed by the Secretary with input from stakeholder
groups. See SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, CHARTER FOR THE ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT
WORK GROUP, supra note 147, at 3-4.
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area is an opportunity for the Secretary to promote basin-wide,
multi-interest problem-solving. I conclude this section with the
suggestion that the Secretary establish a coordinating council to
facilitate the process of providing input to the Secretary and,
ultimately, to take responsibility for addressing specific issues.
A.

The Legal Basis for FederalAuthority
1.

Management Authority Under Statutes
Authorizing Development of the River

The federal government historically has stepped in to defuse
highly contentious battles over entitlements to consumptive use
of Colorado River water. The United States subsidized water
uses and assumed responsibility for the consequences of overdevelopment. This insulated interests in the Colorado River
basin from the economic, social, and environmental impacts of the
single-minded policy of enabling the consumption of Colorado
River water. °6 Federal development of water has relieved
pressure for cooperation; it has actually been a disincentive to the
assumption of responsibility for the Colorado River by non-federal
interests.
Federal largesse was the key to forestalling conflict in the
basin but with it came federal control of many aspects of water
allocation and distribution. The awesome federal powers over
Colorado River management are rooted in congressional mandates that direct the Secretary to operate dams and reservoirs
constructed with federal funds" 7 and to allocate the water stored
in those projects to users by contract.08° Under these laws, the
Secretary can determine by regulation the administration of the

306. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
307. See Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1994); Colorado River
Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 620 (1994); id. §§ 620c, 620f (relating to power plant
operations and contracts); Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1501 (1994);
id. § 1521(b) (limitation on water use from CAP); id. § 1524 (water furnished from
CAP); id. § 1552 (criteria for long-range operation of reservoirs).
308. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 617d, 617g(b) (1994). The contracting provisions of the
Boulder Canyon Project Act were extensively interpreted in Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546, 579 (1962), leaving no doubt about the Secretary's far-reaching powers.
This largely obviated the need for judicial interpretation of similar provisions in the
Colorado River Storage Project Act. There is no reason to think that Congress
intended any different meaning for the mandates in the later statute.
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river and the guiding principles for contracts allowing use of
water from federal facilities.
When Congress passed the Reclamation Act and decided to
build the great projects of the Colorado River, it intended to aid
the settlement of the West. Congress believed that economic
expansion depended on enabling the West to support small family
farms that required irrigation works.80 9 But settlement of the
West moved quickly and the destiny of the West was not to
remain an agricultural society, despite the myths and images
perpetuated for tourists. Instead, the region served by the
Colorado River has become highly urbanized, its growing cities
separated by vast open spaces that draw tourists from all over the
world. 31" Necessarily, the Reclamation program has evolved into
a vehicle to support a multiplicity of national interests. Now,
under the changed circumstances that characterize the New
West, the challenge of meeting multiple objectives has never been
greater.
By the time the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968 was
passed, the nation had moved beyond the simple days when
Bureau of Reclamation projects were designed and operated
primarily to further agricultural expansion in the arid West. The
earlier acts providing for development in the Colorado River basin
also had navigation, flood control, and, incidentally, power
generation purposes.3 1' In the 1968 Act, however, Congress
revised the mandate for the system of water projects in the
Colorado River basin by listing a dizzying array of values and
uses to be furthered.1 2 The mission of the Colorado River basin's
water projects was expanded to include
comprehensive development of the water resources of the
Colorado River Basin ... for the purposes, among others, of
regulating the flow of the Colorado River; controlling floods;
improving navigation; providing for the storage and delivery
of the waters of the Colorado River for reclamation of lands,
including supplemental water supplies, and for municipal,
industrial, and other beneficial purposes; improving water

309. See 35 CONG. REc. 6673-74 (1902) (statement of Sen. Francis G. Newlands,
sponsor of the Reclamation Act of 1902).
310. See FRADKIN, supra note 62, at xv-xvi.
311. See Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1994); Colorado River
Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 620 (1994).
312. See Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1501(a) (1994).
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quality; providing for basic public outdoor recreation facilities;
improving conditions for fish and wildlife, and the generation
and sale of electrical power as an incident of the foregoing
purposes.313
2.

Responsibility for Basin Planning

In the 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act, Congress also
charged the Secretary with developing "a regional water plan"
and setting criteria to coordinate the operation of all the dams. 14
The planning mandate was included in the Act 3 15 to articulate a
pattern of future project development and to pursue the idea,
current in the 1960s, that new sources of imported water should
be found to augment the Colorado River basin's limited supply.
The goal then was to enable full, economic use of the Colorado
River's water while broadening project purposes beyond irriga16
tion.3
Today, although the Bureau of Reclamation does not have a
current basin-wide plan for the Colorado River, the need for
planning has increased and evolved. It may no longer be appropriate to promulgate the regional water plan that Congress
originally envisioned. Further, preferred approaches for natural
resources decisionmaking generally have moved from central
federal control to inclusive, regional, and locally based
processes.31 7 The planning mandate provides an opportunity,
however, to redefine Colorado River management in light of new
values, especially non-consumptive uses.
While the nature of the planning needed for the Colorado
River basin has become more complex and challenging, existing
law furnishes a vehicle for carrying out diverse federal responsibilities in a way that meets today's needs. A basin plan could be

313. Id.
314. Id. The Colorado River Basin Project Act required the Secretary to
"propose criteria for the coordinated long-range operation of the reservoirs
constructed and operated" on the Colorado River under various statutes. Id. §
1552(a).
315. See id. § 1552(a).
316. See REISNER, supra note 40, at 290-93; see also Helen M. Ingram, The
PoliticalEconomy of Regional Water Institutions,55 AM. AGRIC. ECON. 10 (1973).
Some of the authorized projects were known to be infeasible from the start and
became even less practical as time passed.
317. See, e.g., PREEDENVS COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note
149, at 113-15.
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as broad as the Secretary's current authorities and responsibilities. It could be a vehicle for relating and coordinating all of
these functions. The Secretary should now implement the
planning mandate in light of modern demands and deal in a
forward-looking, dynamic way with pressing questions of how to
manage comprehensively the resources of the Colorado River
basin.
3.

Expanded Environmental Protection
Responsibilities

The purposes of the projects on the Colorado River and the
planning responsibilities of the Secretary have been supplemented by three major environmental laws. First, the year after
Congress passed the Colorado River Basin Project Act, which
substantially expanded the purposes of Colorado River projects,
it passed the National Environmental Policy Act,"'8 "requiring all
federal agencies to consider values of environmental preservation
in their spheres of activity."3 19 Besides its well-known requirement that a comprehensive and interdisciplinary environmental
impact statement be prepared for every proposed major federal
action, NEPA also created a process of public participation and
input to precede major environmental decisions. 2 ' The struggle
of citizens groups to use this process to gain input on Colorado
River operations was recounted earlier. 2 '
Second, a few years later, in the ESA, Congress assigned
every federal agency responsibility for ensuring that no action
would be likely to "jeopardize the continued existence" of an
endangered species. 22 As previously discussed, the ESA has a
pervasive impact on river and reservoir operations in the
Colorado River basin.323 The ESA encourages ecosystem planning
318. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat.
852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321- 4370 (West 1994 & Supp.
1997)).
319. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
320. See Council on Environmental Quality, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.19(c) (1978)
(requiring circulation of a draft and final EIS to anyone requesting it); 40 C.F.R. §
1503.1(a)(4) (1978) (requiring an agency to solicit comments from the public
regarding any draft EIS).
321. See supra notes 115-42 and accompanying text.
322. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2) (1994).
323. See supra Part II.B.
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and other measures that can avoid the crises that develop once a
species is jeopardized and heroic measures are mandated.
Finally, the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992 added a
new, specific directive that Glen Canyon Dam shall be operated
"in such a manner as to ...

mitigate adverse impacts to, and

improve the values for which Grand Canyon National Park and
Glen Canyon National Recreation Area were established,
including, but not limited to natural and cultural resources and
visitor use." 24 Although some prior acts authorizing projects
identified recreation as a purpose, this new mandate sent an
important message to federal managers that environmental and
recreational values are important considerations in every
Colorado River management decision.
B. Opportunitiesfor SharingFederal Responsibilities
It is time to use the ample federal power over the Colorado
River in a new way. That power should not be wielded to create
federally designed solutions to problems. Instead, the Secretary
should enable and induce interests in the Colorado River basin to
develop solutions to their problems through participatory,
inclusive processes.
The Secretary should gradually and opportunistically
delegate authority for planning, problem-solving, and negotiated
rulemaking. Of course, the Secretary must ensure that any nonfederal proposal to implement federal responsibilities protects
national interests. Statutory and treaty commitments necessarily
dictate the standards and outer limits bounding Colorado River
basin governance. Within those limits, however, states, tribes,
the power industry, conservation interests, recreationists,
communities, and participants from federal agencies can take the
lead in working out programs, plans, regulations, and solutions
for virtually all aspects of Colorado River management, matters
that lie within the legal authority of the federal government.
It would be preferable for all interests affected by the
Colorado River to come together on their own initiative. The
states, who already meet occasionally, are well-positioned to
initiate inclusive processes for problem-solving. They can invite

324. Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4669
(1992).

634

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

others to participate with them in dealing with specific issues.
Once a voluntarily convened, fully representative group has
reached consensus, it can request the Secretary to put an
imprimatur on the result. If Colorado River interests do not act
voluntarily, however, the Secretary has the duty and responsibility to act within the great scope and
extent of authority vested in
25
that office by the law of the river.1
Voluntary processes have begun to produce some results,
especially in the area of endangered species protection.3 26 Some
states and tribes have also responded to proposed regulations on
water marketing. 27 However, progress has been slow328 and
participation has been limited. This suggests that the Secretary
should initiate activities that result in bringing parties together.
Below I identify a number of areas where the participation of
nonfederal interests in decisionmaking and problem-solving could
greatly benefit the Colorado River basin. The Secretary should
consider creating a more structured process to address these
areas and others where advice and problem-solving by nonfederal interests would be beneficial. In the final section, I urge
that the Secretary create a committee for this purpose under the
Federal Advisory Commission Act.
1.

A New Water Marketing Initiative

The Bureau of Reclamation proposed regulations in 1994 to
permit water transfers and to establish a water bank.3 29 The
Bureau's release of the regulations coincided with water banking
proposals by Nevada and Arizona, and was preceded by a
proposal from California. A Technical Committee of lower basin

325. See supra Part III.A.
326. See supra Part II.B.
327. See supra Part II.A.
328. In December 1996, the Secretary expressed disappointment that progress
had not been made by the states and other interests toward voluntary resolution of
water management issues. See Babbitt Address, supra note 234. A year before, he
spoke to the same group and encouraged them to proceed with several promising
efforts to deal with water banking and marketing to implement the San Luis Rey
Indian Water Settlement and to resolve the problem of excessive water use in
California. See Bruce Babbitt, Address to Colorado River Water Users Ass'n (Dec.
8, 1995) (on file with author). He pledged to support these voluntary efforts. The
initiatives discussed in the Secretary's 1995 speech had stalled or collapsed by the
time of his 1996 speech.
329. See 1994 Proposed Regulations, supra note 253.
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state and tribal interests developed four progress reports that
commented on aspects of the regulations."' Upper basin states,
environmentalists, and others, however, have not been fully
consulted.
It is timely for the Bureau of Reclamation to publish a new
notice of intent to engage in rulemaking regarding water in the
Colorado River basin. The Bureau should especially encourage
input from constituencies that have not previously contributed
their views. It should solicit comments from people with diverse
interests and relevant expertise in water policy, ecology, engineering, and economics. The forum for this consultation could be
a committee assembled either by an expanded body based on the
ongoing meetings of the states, by initiation of the concerned
interests themselves, or, failing voluntary initiation, by the
Secretary's creation of a consultative body.
The differences of opinion that have emerged in the comments on the water marketing regulations signal that it is
unlikely that a consensus will be reached on all the details. The
Secretary could encourage parties to adopt the regulations with
a forceful message that he would prefer to adopt them based on
a consensual process, but that he will adopt them with or without
consensus."3 ' Ultimately, the Secretary must be prepared to
make difficult decisions and to fill gaps whenever the participants
in the rulemaking forum cannot agree. Where disagreement
exists, the Secretary's choice should be guided by a policy of
furthering the integrated management of the Colorado River
basin through the inclusion of all interests and consideration of
all relevant disciplines. If parties disagree whether to expand or
limit water marketability, the Secretary should choose expanded
marketability because it leads to more efficient water uses.

330. See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
331. The Secretary indicated in December 1996 that he would proceed with
another round of proposed regulations but would limit their coverage to intrastate
water banking and to facilitate the interstate water banking concept in the new
Arizona legislation. He left the door open to broadening the coverage of the
regulations, based on a public scoping process if it could be done "without generating
significant controversy or delay." Babbitt Address, supra note 234, at 5. Thus, it is
unlikely that more extensive water banking issues or Indian water marketing
proposals, which were treated in the 1994 proposed regulations, will be part of the
new proposal.
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comports with present
Moreover, promoting water marketability
3 32
policies.
Interior
of
Department
The Secretary must ensure that both statutory mandates and
policies are fulfilled. Thus, even if nonfederal parties reach
consensus on a proposal, it must satisfy legal standards. Perhaps
it is unlikely that a well-constituted rulemaking forum would give
short shrift to requirements such as those found in'the ESA. Yet
it is possible that even with a diverse range of participants, the
Secretary may be required to make choices that conflict with
those recommended by the forum. For example, the forum might
agree on a scheme for storage that facilitates water banking and
transfers and provides for mitigation of the third-party effects,
but neglects to provide sufficient storage of flood waters. If the
forum's scheme did not provide sufficient flood protection, it
would nevertheless be the Secretary's statutory duty to operate
projects to fulfill that goal.33
A rulemaking on water marketing should address the policies
to be reflected in the Bureau of Reclamation's repayment
contracts. The Bureau has hundreds of contracts with districts,
and it participates in contracts between districts and users; many
contracts provide that transfers are subject to federal approval.3 4
New regulations should address necessary and desirable transfer
provisions to be included in new and renewed water service
contracts. This is important because the terms of water service
contracts will either encourage or frustrate the Bureau's recent
policy to facilitate water transfers.3 5
When most existing water service contracts were drafted,
current water marketing concepts were beyond the consideration
of the parties to the contracts. In renewing those contracts, the
Bureau of Reclamation has an opportunity to further water
marketing in ways that will give the Bureau of Reclamation
greater flexibility in serving the needs of the Colorado River

332. See ASSESSMENT 87, supra note 246; see also DANIEL P. BEARD, BUREAU OF
THE COMMISSIONER'S PLAN FOR
RECLAMATION, BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM:
REINVENTING RECLAMATION app. 1 (1993).
333. See supra Part III.A.1.
334. For a description and discussion of such contracts, see Bruce Driver, The
Effect of Reclamation Law on Voluntary Water Transfers, 33 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 26-1 (1988); Guy, supra note 200, at 48; Richard Roos-Colins, Voluntary
Conveyance of the Right to Receive a Water Supply from the United States Bureau of
Reclamation, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 773, 836 (1987).
335. See ASSESSMENT 87, supra note 246, at 5.
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basin. Moreover, since the negotiation of many water service
contracts, Bureau of Reclamation law and policy have modified
acreage limitations and required conservation measures." 6
Parties to Bureau of Reclamation contracts usually must anticipate revisions that are necessary to keep pace with changing
policy. 3 7 Water marketing regulations should address these
issues, as did the 1991 and 1994 Bureau of Reclamation proposals. 8 The policies expressed in the regulations then can be
implemented through appropriate contractual provisions.
2.

Coordinated Development and Operation of
Projects
a.

Development-Animas-La Plata?

Planning for water project development in the Colorado River
Basin-generally considered passe-may have continuing
viability. Although the Boulder Canyon Project Act authorized
five upper basin projects and gave birth to the now-completed
CAP, it is now widely accepted that some of the projects will
never be built. 39 However, one project that remains in discussion
and that would benefit from further planning is the Animas-La
Plata Project, which, as originally planned, now faces apparently
insurmountable legal, economic, and political barriers to its
construction. 4 °
336. See, e.g., Reclamation Reform Act of 1982,43 U.S.C. §§ 373a, 390aa-390zz1, 422e, 425b, 485h, 502 (1996).
337. See, e.g., Peterson v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799 (9th
Cir. 1990) (upholding "hammer clause" requiring denial of water service to more than
160 acres owned or leased by a single owner, unless the water service contract was
amended to reflect higher prices).
338. See 1991 Proposed Regulations, supra note 246; 1994 Proposed
Regulations, supra note 253; see also BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, PRINCIPLES GOVERNING VOLUNTARY WATER TRANSACTIONS THAT INVOLVE
OR AFFECT FACILITIES OWNED OR OPERATED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

(1988).
339. See Getches, supra note 1, at 450.
340. See Mark Obmascik, Criticism of Animas Growing: N.M. Cites Dam
Concerns,DENV. POST, Mar. 20, 1995, at B1. The project was first approved in 1968,
but was delayed for years by cost concerns. See id. It remained controversial, but
its funding was approved in 1988 as part of a negotiated settlement of the water
rights of the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Tribes. See H. Josef Hebert,
Animas-La PlataBattle Hasn't Ended; Doubt About Benefits, Fearof Development
Undermine Costly Plans,ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Dec. 26, 1996, at 38A. Project water
would be taken from the Animas River and pumped up to a reservoir built on top of
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The Animas-La Plata project would have shared the fate of
other vestiges of the expired big dam era but for the fact that it
was the key element in a negotiated resolution of major Indian
tribal water rights claims. If, as appears to be the case, the
project cannot be built consistent with that negotiated resolution,
another means of fulfilling the water rights of the Southern Ute
and Ute Mountain Ute Tribes on the Animas and La Plata Rivers
must be found. Otherwise, the enforcement of those tribal rights
will threaten the established farming operations of families in
southern Colorado that depend on those streams. Colorado
Governor Roy Romer and Lieutenant Governor Gail Schoettler
have initiated a process to explore alternatives to Animas-La
Plata. 4 ' The process includes not only the federal, state, and
tribal officials who participated in the original negotiated
agreement, but also includes interests that were unrepresented
in the negotiating process such as environmentalists and the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency.34
Although it surely complicates matters to include more
parties as the Animas-La Plata project is reconsidered, their
exclusion could undermine the viability of any settlement.
Environmental objections based on the ESA and other grounds
emerged after Congress had approved the settlement, and they

a mountain. It would then be released into project works, which would distribute it
in the watershed of the La Plata River. See id. About 190,000 acre-feet of water
would be diverted for irrigation and municipal uses, with a third of the water being
delivered to the Ute tribes. See id. The project would take 1000 workers and 15
years to complete. See id.
The Animas-La Plata Project would cost more than $700 million to build; federal
taxpayers would pay about $458 million. A recent government study estimates that
every dollar spent on the project would produce about $.36 worth of benefits. The
cost of delivering water to irrigate land is more than $7000/acre, not including
pumping costs. Much of the land to be irrigated is semi-arid. See A Dam Foolish
Investment, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 5, 1996, at 6B; see also Hydrosphere
Resource Consultants, Animas-La Plata Alternatives Study 10-11 (Oct. 8, 1995)
(unpublished report, on file with author).
Recently a diverse, bipartisan group of environmentalists, tax-reform groups,
and consumer advocates formed the Stop Corporate Welfare Coalition. See
'CorporateWelfare'Is Targeted by Liberal-ConservativeCoalition, CHI.TRiB., Jan. 29,
1997, at 8.The group has been lobbying Congress to curtail wasteful spending. The
group included the Animas-La Plata Project in its "Terrible Twelve" group and has
called for its elimination from the budget. See id.
341. See Ed Marston, Cease.fire Called on Animas.La Plata Front, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS, Nov. 11, 1996, at 1.
342. See id.
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eventually led to the present need to reconsider the project. 43
Some of these problems might have been foreseen and avoided
had fish and wildlife advocates and other interests participated
in the negotiation process. If these interests are not represented
now, as parties return to the table, they may upset a negotiated
solution later. By contrast, almost any package that is presented
by diverse constituencies will
to Congress with broad acceptance
3 44
be more favorably received.

Before Congress approved the settlement, it altered the terms
of the agreement. When the parties-two tribes, the state, and
the federal agencies-presented their negotiated settlement to
Congress in 1987, the MWD and other non-parties opposed it.
Congress responded by unilaterally changing a provision regarding off-reservation water transfers. 45
One option for fulfilling tribal rights in a new agreement
might be to provide tribes with physical facilities and legal
authority to market their water off their reservations and
possibly out of state.3 46 Perhaps basin-wide interests should join
in deliberations on how to address the claims of the two Ute
tribes in Colorado, thereby forestalling legal and political
challenges to any off-reservation marketing that is included in a
new settlement.
In crafting options for resolution of the Colorado Ute claims,
it may further help to draw on the recent experiences of others in
the Colorado River basin. For instance, by reconfiguring the
Central Utah Project ("CUP"), Utah, the federal government, local
water users, and diverse interests concerned with recreation, fish,
343. See Steve Hinchman, Animas-La Plata: The Last Big Dam in the West,
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Mar. 22, 1993, at 1; see also Adrian N. Hansen, The

EndangeredSpecies Act and Extinction of Reserved Indian Water Rights on the San
Juan River, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 1305, 1327-28 (1995).

344. In the 10 years since it authorized the project, Congress has appropriated
only about $20 million toward the $710 million construction cost. President Clinton
has included $6 million in his FY 1998 budget for the project. See Adriel Bettelheim,
InteriorAsks for 6.6%Budget Hike, DENV.POST,Feb. 7, 1997, at A16; Marston, supra
note 341.
345. Settlement agreement as modified, Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights
Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-585, 102 Stat. 2973 (1988). For House
debate, see 134 CONG.REC. H27,878 (1988). For Senate debate, see 134 CONG.REC.
S30,998 (1988). For MWD's opposition, see Utes, CaliforniaClash on Water-Project
Plans,ROcKY MTN. NEWS, Aug. 23, 1987, at 6B. For a discussion of the lower basin
states' opposition to the original settlement agreement, see Warren J. Abbott,
CaliforniaColoradoRiver Issues, 19 PAC. L.J. 1391, 1427 (1988).
346. See Hydrosphere Resource Consultants, supra note 340, at 14-15.
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and wildlife developed a complex solution to a multiplicity of
problems.147 The CUP had become cumbersome, expensive, and
ill-suited to emerging municipal demands and changing standards of efficiency."
Moreover, tribal rights were virtually
ignored in its development.149 Future funding to complete the
project grew increasingly tenuous, casting doubt on whether the
nation could keep faith with its commitments to the tribe.
Then the Central Utah Completion Act was passed, based on
locally developed, federally approved solutions. It revamped the
project plans, establishing an extensive agricultural water
conservation program,35 0 a program to protect minimum stream
flows,3 51 and measures to mitigate environmental problems. 5 2
Further provisions for settling the Ute Tribe's water rights allow
the tribe to market some of its water off-reservation using Bureau
of Reclamation facilities to transport its water to cities.35 3

347. See Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4669 (1992), amending Colorado River Storage Project Act,
43 U.S.C. §§ 620(a)-(o) (1996).
348. See WATERS OF ZION: THE POLITICS OF WATER IN UTAH 67-68 (Daniel C.
McCool ed., 1995).
349. See Getches, supra note 1, at 440-41.
350. The Central Utah Completion Act was passed as part of the Reclamation
Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act on Oct 30, 1992. See Pub. L. No. 102-575,
Tits. II-VI, 106 Stat. 4600 (1992). The Act mandates that Wasatch County conserve
5000 acre-feet of water. Id. § 206(b). This is implemented under the Wasatch County
Water Efficiency Study Preliminary Planning Report. James M. Montgomery,
Consulting Engineers, Inc., Wasatch County Water Efficiency Study Preliminary
Planning Report (1993) (on file with author). The study proposes measures that
could conserve 50,000 acre-feet per year by conversion from flood irrigation to
sprinklers with conserved water dedicated to environmental purposes such as stream
flows and wetlands. Id. at 2-7. Municipal and industrial users will also be able to
extend their water supply through conservation measures and to forestall
construction of new treatment facilities by utilizing water exchanges. See id. at 3-28,
3-34 to -36.
351. See Pub. L. No. 102-575 § 303, 106 Stat. at 4632-35.
352. The Act established a Utah Mitigation and Conservation Commission and
a financial account for its use for a comprehensive, integrated program to address the
environmental effects of Bureau of Reclamation projects in Utah. The fund receives
contributions from several sources including the federal government, hydropower
revenues from the Colorado River Storage Project, the state, and water users. See
§§ 301, 401, 106 Stat. at 4625-32, 4648-50. The Wasatch County Water Efficiency
Study, supra note 350, also allows for restoration of dewatered streams and
associated riparian areas, and for reestablishment of thousands of acres of wetlands.
353. See Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 503, 106 Stat. at 4652-53 (1992). Water
marketed off the reservation is subject to Utah state water laws, and sales to lower
basin states require agreement of all seven parties to the Colorado River Compact.
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Now, the CUP is moving ahead and a major Indian water
rights settlement has been achieved in Utah because innovative
solutions were found. The interests who were excluded from the
original project planning subsequently participated in
reconfiguring the project so that it would be more efficient and
environmentally beneficial. When the details of the project and
the Indian settlement were negotiated, the package had a broad
coalition of support. 54 Although the CUP process was neither
carefully premeditated nor particularly smooth in its execution,
it suggests elements of an approach that could be useful as the
Animas-La Plata Project is reconsidered.
b.

Operating Criteria

The rules for operating the reservoirs that control all of the
waters of the Colorado River, known as criteria for the coordinated long-range operation of the Colorado River reservoir
system, were adopted in 1970,"'5 as required by the Colorado
River Basin Project Act of 1968.56 These criteria, in turn, require
annual operating plans for the projects in the system.' Substantial revision of either the long-range operating criteria ("LROC")
or the annual plans has never occurred, and public participation
in reviewing them has been limited.35 Basin states, which have
been systematically consulted on both LROC and annual operating plans, prefer not to open them to change. 59 Although in
recent years the public review process has expanded, few
interests other than the states have attempted to use periodic
promulgation of these
criteria as opportunities to influence
3 60
policy.
River
Colorado

354. See WATERS OF ZION: THE POLITICS OF WATER IN UTAH, supra note 348, at
66, 181-86.
355. 35 Fed. Reg. 8951 (1970).
356. 43 U.S.C. § 1552 (1968).
357. See id. § 1552(b).
358. See Review of Existing Coordinated Long-Range Operating Criteria for
Colorado River Reservoirs, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,246 (1996).
359. See id.; see also Public Hearings Yield No Support for Change in LongTerm Criteriafor Operation of ColoradoRiver Reservoirs, WATER INTELLIGENCE
MONTHLY, Dec. 1996, at 2 [hereinafter Public Hearings Yield No Support].
360. In connection with the latest review of operating criteria, two public
meetings were held. However, few people attended. See Public Hearings Yield No
Support, supra note 359. It is not surprising that the public does not view the
operating criteria as a vehicle for producing changes in the way that the river is
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Federal law provides that the proposed LROC are to be
submitted to the seven basin states' governors "and to such other
parties and agencies as the Secretary may deem appropriate for
their review and comment.""'1 Modifications of the LROC can be
made from time to time, with review initiated by the Secretary
every five years following this process. 2 The Secretary also must
give annual reports to the governors and Congress. 6 ' Beyond
this, however, there is no prescribed process for public input.
Less consultation could be challenged as unlawful; more is not
mandated but seems well within the scope of the Secretary's
discretion.
Although they have strict numerical requirements for
quantities of water to be released, the LROC have provided little
guidance on coordinated management. The LROC's explicit
requirements and guidance for reservoir releases reflect the
singular policy objective of ensuring the delivery of water from
the upper basin to the lower basin consistent with the law of the
river.6 4 The LROC leave the details to annual plans of operation.
According to the LROC, it is in the annual plans that uses like
"flood control, river regulation, beneficial consumptive uses,
power production, water quality control, recreation, enhancement
of fish and wildlife, and other environmental factors are to be
considered." 365 But the annual plans have given little systemwide

attention to these factors. The Secretary could expand the
coverage of both the LROC and the annual plans, and could
enlarge the discussion of proposed modifications.

operated. The notice of the meetings said: "Previous reviews of these Criteria were
initiated in 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990. They resulted in no changes to the operating
criteria." 61 Fed. Reg. 56246 (1996).
361. 43 U.S.C. § 1552(b).
362. See id.; Review of Existing Coordinated Long-Range Operating Criteria for
Colorado River Reservoirs, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,246 (1996).
363. See 43 U.S.C. § 1552(b).
364. Even this could be done more effectively and compatibly with the law of
the river. The LROC actually limit the flexibility inherent in a compact that allows
averaging of deliveries over a moving, ten-year window of time. The LROC, however,
establish an objective annual release requirement for most years. This has not
operated to the detriment of the upper basin but has the potential to do so in the
future under conditions of drought and full utilization of apportionments. See
MacDonnell & Getches, supra note 5, at 22.
Others have suggested modifying the operating criteria to facilitate interstate
water marketing. See Guy, supra note 200, at 45.
365. Operating Criteria and 1997 Annual Plan of Operations for Glen Canyon
Dam Part 1(2), 62 Fed. Reg. 9447 (1997).

COLORADO RIVER GOVERNANCE

1997]

The Glen Canyon EIS process described above is a precedent
for structuring a process to develop and modify basin-wide LROC
and project-specific plans. The EIS led to the Secretary's
acceptance of a new operating regime designed to reduce the
adverse impacts of Glen Canyon Dam by changing the frequency
and timing of releases.""6 It required sacrificing some of the
power-generating capacity of the dam, but allowed for the
enhancement of endangered fish habitat and for the improvement
of recreational uses of the Colorado River in the Grand Canyon."
The Secretary can properly carry out responsibilities for
planning, operating facilities, and allocating water by contract
from the Colorado River system only by considering the basinwide impacts of major changes in how the facilities on the
Colorado River are operated. There are wide-ranging and
sometimes conflicting public values that must be served by the
projects in the system. In addition, the public demands a
balanced fulfillment of those values. Thus, it is surely advisable
to plan and set LROC with the benefit of full public participation
by affected interests and relevant areas of expertise. Operating
criteria for Colorado River basin projects potentially affect every
aspect of the environment and economy in the basin. Thus, the
LROC should be expanded beyond their primary concern with
allocation issues. As regulations, they would be a fitting subject
for negotiated rulemaking. Their implementation should be
monitored and modified with input from a representative group
employing adaptive management principles.
c.

Surplus Water

The Bureau of Reclamation's regulations should address
more definitively whether and when "surplus water" can be
released from Glen Canyon Dam for the use of the lower basin
states. A declaration of a surplus condition under the Colorado
River Basin Project Act allows the Bureau to allocate water to the
lower basin states in excess of 7.5 million acre-feet in a single
year.36 This is especially important to California because its

366. See supranote 144 and accompanying text.
367. See GLEN CANYON DAM FINAL STATEMENT, supranote 141, at 61-63.
368. See 43 U.S.C. § 1552 (1994). The LROC adopted under this act provide for
a minimum objective release of 8.23 million acre-feet. See Operating Criteria and
Annual Plan of Operations for Glen Canyon Dam Part II, 62 Fed. Reg. 9447 (1997).
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present water demands exceed its nominal apportionment of 4.4
million acre-feet. In fact, the Secretary has contracts with water
users in California amounting to 5.362 million acre-feet of water
per year."6 9 California's excessive water use presented no
problem when Arizona and Nevada used less than their annual
apportioned shares. Beginning in 1991, however, the lower basin
states' total demand for Colorado River water was first anticipated to exceed 7.5 million acre-feet:370 Arizona was expected to
take more water upon completion of the CAP, and Nevada was
growing and taking more of its entitlement. Initially, California's
excess demands, which pushed lower basin usage over the lower
basin allocation, were accommodated with an arrangement that
assumed California was "borrowing" water that it would pay back
later.Y
For 1996, however, the Bureau of Reclamation officially
declared a surplus, allowing California to take 5.2 million acrefeet, well over its entitlement of 4.4 million acre-feet.3 72 The
surplus is technically shared by the three lower basin states. 73
Thus, California used Arizona's and Nevada's portions of the
This includes the 7.5 million acre-feet of average annual delivery to which the lower
basin is entitled at Lee Ferry, plus .75 million acre-feet, which is one-half of the
annual U.S. obligation to deliver 1.5 million acre-feet to Mexico, minus the 20,000
acre-feet that naturally flow into the river above Lee Ferry from the Paria River.
The Secretary, if certain requirements are met, may release additional "surplus"
water from the upper basin to the lower basin and from Lake Mead to the lower
basin states for their use. First, the Secretary considers whether there is water in
storage in the upper basin greater than the quantity considered "necessary" under
the annual operating plan. If there is, releases can be made in excess of the 8.23
million acre-feet for lower basin uses, to equalize storage in Lake Mead (behind
Hoover Dam) and Lake Powell (behind Glen Canyon Dam), or to avoid spills from
Lake Powell. The amount "necessary" is determined pursuant to Part II(1) of the
Operating Criteria and upon consideration of several historical and predicted
hydrologic factors set forth in § 602 (a) of the Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43
U.S.C. § 1552(a) (1994). If greater than normal quantities of water are available, the
Secretary can then allocate water from Lake Mead for use in the three lower basin
states in excess of their annual allocation. See § 111(3). This surplus is to be divided
among the states according to the formula approved in Arizona v. California,376
U.S. 340, 342 (1964) (California, 50%; Arizona, 46%; Nevada, 4%).
369. See ARTHUR L. LITTLEWORTH & ERIC L. GARNER, CALIFORNIA WATER 290
(1995). These contracts have meaning when and if other contractors do not use their
full amount, when California uses water that is apportioned to but unused by other
lower basin states, and when surplus water is released for the lower basin.
370. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
371. See Letter from Wayne E. Cook, supra note 212, at 2.
372. See Reclamation Increases Water Available to Lower Colorado Basin
States, WATER INTELLIGENCE MONTHLY, Sept. 1996, at 2-3.
373. See Arizona, 376 U.S. at 342.
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surplus as well as the unused basic entitlements of those two
states.
It is clear that parties beyond the three lower basin states
have an interest in the surplus water issue. The upper basin
states are potentially affected by the circumstances and terms of
additional releases of stored water by the Bureau of Reclamation.
Every release beyond required deliveries and flood control
requirements potentially removes water from Lake Powell that
otherwise would be available to fulfill the upper basin's required
delivery to the lower basin of 7.5 million acre-feet in future
years. 74 Under a liberal policy of surplus releases, the upper
basin states could negotiate a system of payments to the upper
basin states from the benefiting lower basin states. These
payments would be justified as consideration for the upper basin
states' giving up a measure of "insurance" in the form of stored
water that is available to meet their future Compact delivery
obligations to the lower basin. Furthermore, the Bureau of
Reclamation could condition surplus releases on the lower basin
beneficiaries' mitigating problems created by their past and
future use and development of Colorado River water, problems
like degraded fish habitat and salinity that pervade the lower
Colorado River basin. Mitigation could be effected by specific
projects or by payments into a fund or trust established for that
purpose.
In addition, recreational interests, hydropower customers,
environmental groups, scientists, and the tribes all have a stake
in the release of surplus water. Environmentalists, for instance,
may want to ensure that a share of any actual surplus is
dedicated to protection and enhancement of natural systems. The
Bureau of Reclamation should involve all interested parties in
developing the surplus regulations.
3.

Unite Approaches to Endangered Species
Protection

Two major efforts to deal with endangered species protection
in the Colorado River basin are described above. 375 The upper
374. Indeed, the upper basin states have expressed their concerns with the 1996
surplus releases. See Reclamation Increases Water Available to Lower Colorado
Basin States, supra note 372, at 2-3.
375. See supra Part II.B.
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basin recovery implementation program has accumulated almost
ten years' experience. It was one of the first efforts in the country
to convene federal and state agencies, water users, and conservation groups in planning and implementing such a program. The
lower basin program is in the formative stages. It is among a new
wave of negotiated responses to the requirements of the ESA."'8
The lower basin multi-species program seeks to avoid future
listing of species that may be affected by future development. 7 7
In addition, two separate implementation programs address the
endangered fish of the San Juan River (a tributary to the
Colorado) and the Grand Canyon. 8 '
Federal responsibility for recovery of endangered fish in the
Colorado River basin is widely dispersed. Programs, or parts of
programs, are under the jurisdiction of two regional offices of the
Service and two regional offices of the Bureau of Reclamation. 7 9
Some of the programs also involve participation by the Bureau of
Land Management, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the
National Park Service.38 ° Although they deal with habitats for
some of the same species, the programs are uncoordinated. The
fragmentation of responsibility for protecting related species and
habitats is not in the best interests of the fish, and it creates
inconsistent requirements for agencies and water users. 8 '
Indeed, the two regional offices of the Service define "recovery"
differently for the same species in different parts of the Colorado
River basin.38 2
Each of the seven basin states is involved in at least one of
the four endangered species programs, but no state is involved in
all of them. Recovery efforts also affect several Indian tribes.

376. See Albert L. Lin, Participants'Experience with Habitat Conservation
Plans and Suggestions for Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369, 372
(1996) (noting that while only 39 habitat conservation plans ("HCPsU)were approved
between 1982 and 1994, 45 HCPs were approved between January and September
1995).
377. The participants in the lower basin states' partnership signed an MOA,
which specified a three-year period for the development of a multi-species
conservation program ('MSCP'). The MOA assured the participants that the Service
and the Bureau of Reclamation would work with the states through the MSCP
process to meet the requirements of the ESA. See supra text accompanying note 298.
378. See Wigington & Pontius, supra note 277, at 58-61, 66.
379. See id. at 44.
380. See id. at 61, 64-65.
381. See id. at 67.
382. See id.
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The San Juan program, which deals with habitat just upstream
of Lake Powell, has pitted the interests of the Navajo Tribe
against those of the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute
Tribes. 8 3 These governments need a process for orderly,
coordinated consideration of integrated efforts to recover the
same species.
The four programs to promote recovery of the Colorado
River's endangered fish species should be linked. A recent report
criticizes the "compartmentalized" approach taken to recovery of
the Colorado River's listed, big-river fishes and recommends that
there be true range-wide recovery planning for endangered fish
species. 384 The report concludes that "[1]eaving such range-wide
planning unattended invites overlap or... counter-productive
'
Addressing this
competition between these programs."385
criticism seems both sensible and necessary if recovery efforts are
to comply effectively with the ESA.
A coordinating entity, formal or informal, should be established to provide regular exchanges among all the Colorado River
endangered fish programs and to pursue linkages among related
plans. While each species' recovery plan would continue to be
separately implemented, planning and design of the programs
could be coordinated to achieve maximum effectiveness. From
the start, the incipient lower basin multi-species program should
consider fully the habitat needs of the species with which it deals
and consider proposing a coordinating mechanism. In the course
of periodic updating and revision, the programs need to account
for their interrelationships with one another and for their
respective implementation of plans. Ultimately, all the implementation programs could share some common staff and funding
to help them better pursue a comprehensive approach.

383. See Water Problems Facing the Lower Colorado River Area: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Water and Power of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Nat.
Resources, 104th Cong. 166 (1994) (testimony of George Arthur, President of the
Colorado River Basin Tribes Partnership); Michael Haederle, Threat to Fish May
Put New Mexico IrrigationProject in Hot Water Environment:Dispute Has Drawn
in Federal Agencies, Indian Tribes, and Environmentalists, L.A. TIMES, May 25,
1991, at A21.
384. See Wigington & Pontius, supra note 277, at 67-68.
385. Id. at 68.
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A Colorado River Science and Data Center

If multiple and diverse economic and ecological goals are to
be attained, management decisions in the Colorado River basin
must be based on the best available knowledge. A Colorado River
Science and Data Center (the "Center") could publish annual
statistics for all decisionmakers and serve as a single repository
for data. Colorado River issues could be referred to the Center if
it were an independent science entity, with a permanent staff of
scientists and technicians. The Center could coordinate the work
of a peer review board or a network of experts in considering the
design of proposed studies and the integrity of reports. For
instance, if it were necessary to decide on a method of calculating
seepage return flows to the Colorado River in order to determine
consumptive uses, the Center could convene a panel to develop
the necessary information and resolve the relevant scientific
questions.
The framework for the Center could be developed by a blue
ribbon committee of scientific experts from federal and state
government agencies, environmental organizations, and private
industry. It could seek to have the many entities that now hold
and manage data, studies, and computer programs turn them
over to the Center or pool those resources in a clearinghouse
arrangement."' All of these data, as well as ongoing studies,
could be well-managed under the U.S. Geological Survey, an
agency respected for its objectivity and scientific rigor: its
mission has been expanded recently, by creation of the National
Biological Service, to include all of the natural sciences. 87

386. Federal sources potentially include data collected by Bureau of
Reclamation, some in the Denver Headquarters office, some in the upper and lower
basin regional offices; data and information developed by the Glen Canyon
Environmental Studies and EIS process; studies and data on fish habitat and related
information produced and maintained by the Service in connection with the upper
basin endangered fish recovery program; and data and studies related to salinity
problems and control measures that are kept by the Bureau of Reclamation and the
Department of Agriculture's Natural Resources Conservation Service. The Bureau
of Reclamation also manages a computer program that simulates the river system,
using it to analyze effects of varied flows, diversions, and conditions. The program
could benefit from updating and inclusion of additional parameters, a project that
could be properly undertaken by the proposed center.
Each of the states also has data, information, and computer models that could
be shared with a trusted central repository. Similarly, data and studies developed
by universities, institutes, states, tribes, and other interests could be assembled.
387. See Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 123, 110
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The Department of the Interior has already established a
Grand Canyon Monitoring and Research Center to furnish
scientific and technical information to the Group established
pursuant to the Glen Canyon EIS.3"' It is also responsible for
monitoring and research programs under the Grand Canyon
Protection Act.38 9 The Grand Canyon Center could be expanded
to address the broader mission of the Center recommended here.
5.

StudyTransfer of Federal Facilities

Numerous commentators have called for the defederalization
of federal water and power facilities in the West.39 ° Of course,
this would require legislation. In recent years, although no
proposals have been passed, Congress has taken up several issues
regarding the sale of federal power facilities.391
In 1985, Congress considered raising prevailing belowmarket rates for the power facilities to increase revenues for the
benefit of the treasury and to reduce the national budget
deficit. 92 The Western Governors' Association then published a

Stat. 26, 32-33 (1996).
388. See Office of the Assistant Secretary for Water and Science, U.S. Dep't of
the Interior, Guidelines for the Grand Canyon Monitoring and Research Center 1
(1996) [hereinafter Guidelines] (on file with author). For discussion concerning the
Adaptive Management Work Group, see supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
389. See Guidelines, supra note 388, at 1-2.
390. See Transfer of Reclamation Facilities: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on
Water and Power Resources of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong. (1995)
(statements of Roger Patterson, Regional Director of the Mid-Pacific Region, Bureau
of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, and Scott L. Campbell); see also
Reclamation Facilities Transfer Act: Hearing on S. 620 Before the Subcomm. on
Forests and Pub. Land Management of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Nat.
Resources, 104th Cong. 6-8 (1995) (statement of Daniel P. Beard, Commissioner,
Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior); Taking over the CVP,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 14, 1995, at B6.
391. See Federal Power Administration Privatization Act of 1995, H.R. 310,
104th Cong. (1995); Power Marketing Administration Privatization and Reform Act
of 1996, H.R. 3878, 104th Cong. (1996); Reclamation Facilities Transfer Act, S. 620,
H.R. 1232, 104th Cong. (1995).
For a general discussion of privatization issues surrounding federal power
facilities, see the testimony in PowerMarketingAdministrations Transfer: Oversight
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Water and Power Resources of the House Comm. on
Resources, 104th Cong. 56-58 (1995) (statement of Bruce C.Driver, Special Counsel
to the Land and Water Fund of the Rockies).
392. See Defending OMB's Planto Quicken andIncrease PMA Payments,INSIDE
ENERGY/WITH FEDERAL LANDS, Mar. 11, 1985, at 6b, available in LEXIS, News

Library, Inenergy File.
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report considering a basin council for the Colorado River that
would manage water and power resources, including power
generation. 93 If power rates were raised, the benefit of the
increased revenues could be kept and used in the basin. The
proposed basin council then would perform strategic resource
planning; examine economic, social, and environmental issues;
and finance water-related needs in the Colorado River basin with
power revenues. 94 The idea of a basin council was inspired by
the Northwest Power Planning Council in the Columbia River
basin and, like that council, its activities would be funded by
power revenues.9 5
More recently, the Clinton Administration and some members of Congress have proposed transferring ownership of federal
water and power facilities to private or local interests."' Motives
for transferring their ownership include promoting the efficient
operation of federal water and power facilities, capturing the
value of federal investments in these projects to reduce the
deficit, and furthering ideologies opposed to federal ownership of
property. The federal government could reduce current budget
deficits with the proceeds from the sale of water and power
facilities, and also eliminate the annual expenditures that
subsidize them. In addition, new streams of tax revenue would
be created if facilities were transferred to taxable private
entities. 9 7
Proponents of transferred ownership or
defederalization also argue as a matter of principle that the

393. See LEE & CLARK, supra note 16, at 25-26.
394. See id.
395. See id. at 26-27.
396. This was proposed as a part of the National Performance Review under
Vice President Gore, a program that has led to substantial downsizing of
government. VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE, THE BEST KEPT SECRETS IN GOVERNMENT:
A REPORT TO PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON (1996). As part of the review, the
Administration considered a program of transferring title, operation, and
maintenance responsibilities for federal Bureau of Reclamation facilities. See, e.g.,
Hearingson S. 620 Before the Subcomm. on Forestsand Public Land Management
of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Nat. Resources, 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony
of Daniel P. Beard, Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the
Interior). The Reclamation Facilities Transfer Act, S. 620, H.R. 1232, 104th Cong.
(1995) was introduced in Congress, but it did not pass.
397. See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, POWER MARKETING
ADMINISTRATIONS: COST RECOVERY, FINANCING, AND COMPARISON TO NONFEDERAL
UTILITIES ch. 0:3 (GAO/AIMD-96-145 1996).
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federal government should not be in the business of developing
power and water. 8'
Critics of defederalization contend that the sale of such
facilities on terms that simply recovered the outstanding federal
investment would be a windfall for the buyers, and that seeking
a one-time gain for the federal treasury would be short-sighted.s"
Opponents also argue that transfers of public assets, such as
federal dams into non-federal hands could devastate the environment unless they are accompanied by strict, protective conditions.
For example, the unrestrained defederalization of facilities in the
Colorado River basin could lead to a return to the practice of
maximizing power production and profits by releasing water at
widely fluctuating levels that harm the Colorado River's ecosystem. 400
A major difficulty with defederalization is that many federal
water and power projects, especially multi-purpose, multi-state
systems like those in the Colorado River basin, typically serve a
variety of public concerns, not merely economic concerns with
power generation, water storage, and water distribution. The
federal government is obliged to recover a portion of the costs of
project construction and current operation and maintenance.4 '
But it also is required by law to operate the projects to further
398. The notion that energy production is not an appropriate governmental role
has led to privatization of utility systems around the globe. See PrivatizingFederal
Functions;A FederalPrivatizationAgenda, 1995: HearingsBefore the Senate Budget
Comm., 104th Cong. (1995) [hereinafter PrivatizingFederalFunctions] (statement
of Robert W. Poole, Jr., President of the Reason Foundation). In 1994, electric
utilities worth almost $11 billion were privatized worldwide. See id.
399. See Transfer of Power Marketing Administrations: HearingsBefore the
Subcomm. on Water and Power Resources of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th
Cong. (1995) (statement of Bruce C. Driver, Special Counsel to the Land and Water
Fund of the Rockies); see also Reclamation FacilitiesTransferAct: Hearingson H.R.
1232 Before the Subcomm. on Water and Power Resources of the House Comm. on
Resources, 104th Cong. (1995) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 1232] (statement of
Steven Malloch, Environmental Defense Fund).
Opponents of defederalization argue that it could lead to higher electric rates.
One reason why is that government entities, unlike private entities, are exempt from
local, state, and federal taxes, and have other advantages such as the ability to
borrow at below-market rates from the Treasury and to issue tax-free bonds.
Proponents of divestiture respond that the low rates provided by government-run
entities lead to inefficient resource use. See PrivatizingFederal Functions,supra
note 398 (statement of Robert W. Poole, Jr.).
400. See Hearingson H.R. 1232, supra note 399 (statement of Steven Malloch).
401. See, e.g., Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1543(d) (1994);
Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 620e (1994); Boulder Canyon Project
Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617d (1994).
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governmental interests like flood control, navigation, water
quality, recreation, and fish and wildlife.4 °2 Furthermore, the
federal government has overarching legal obligations imposed by
statutes, treaties, and contracts that can be advanced by proper
management of the facilities. These include such governmental
functions as mediating interstate relations, honoring commitments to Indian tribes, protecting national heritage resources
such as the Grand Canyon, furthering international relations
with Mexico, and satisfying national environmental concerns such
as the protection of endangered species.4"'
For the federal
government to relinquish some or all of its control of water and
power facilities to non-federal entities, it must have assurance
that those national interests will be carried out at least as well as
they are now.
The concept of Colorado River basin governance, in which the
full range of interests-including national interests-are wellrepresented, suggests an opportunity for defederalization with
governmental functions informed by, and perhaps in some
respects assigned to, an entity representing diverse interests and
expertise. By including in the rate base the costs of basin
governance and the activities and investments of a governing
entity, power generation would provide an ample self-financing
mechanism. Alternatively, without changing ownership or
operation of the facilities, Congress could simply direct that a
portion of power revenues be dedicated to a fund to finance
operations and projects of the process (or entity) created to
undertake shared governance of the Colorado River basin's
resources. The fund could be maintained with a small increase in
power rates.
Today, the Colorado River power system generates more than
$157 million per year.40 4 Because it must not charge more than
the "cost" of generating power,40 ' it sells power to its customers
well below market rates.40 0 The federal government has a
financial interest in recovering the taxpayers' investment in the

402. See supra notes 311-13 and accompanying text.
403. See supraPart III.A.3.
404. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, 25TH ANNUAL REPORT: OPERATION OF THE
COLORADO RIVER BASIN 1995 AND PROJECTED OPERATIONS 1996 25 (1996).
405. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 618 (1994) (listing the various costs associated with
the project).
406. See WESTERN AREA POWER ADMIN., supra note 134, at 25, 36; see also
Bishop, supra note 54, at 12.
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facilities. Beyond that, the great "cash cow" hydroelectric system
in the basin could be operated to provide revenues to support
basin governance activities and to carry out obligations for
furthering other national interests now assumed by the federal
agencies. With appropriate changes in federal law, the revenues
could be spent for everything from endangered species recovery
and the operation of a water bank to project construction and the
resolution of tribal water claims. In a sense, all these expenditures are for "costs" indirectly imposed by the system that
generates the power. Thus, using power revenue to compensate
for these effects is consistent with economic theory. In addition,
power revenues could help finance water conservation measures
to help reduce demand for consumptive water uses throughout
the Colorado River basin.
There is a further advantage to placing control of the
hydropower system in the hands of an entity charged with
responsibility for reconciling competing demands for water
delivery, wildlife, environmental protection, and other interests.
The entity could make decisions about whether, when, and how
much power to generate in light of the consequences for all
affected interests and the impacts on power revenues. Forgoing
generation of power for environmental purposes could be weighed
against the loss of revenues that could be used for basin benefits.
A bolder, more comprehensive form of control, emulating true
defederalization, could also be considered. A public-private
consortium might take control and ownership of the water and
power facilities under a trust arrangement, which would require
the consortium to use the assets and profits for the long-term
stewardship of basin resources on terms that would further the
federal government's mandates. For improper or inadequate
performance, there would necessarily be enforceable consequences, including the reversion of control and ownership.
C.

Convene a Colorado River Basin Coordinating
Committee

An attractive option for dealing with the Secretary's
Colorado River responsibilities would be to establish a coordinating committee to advise the Secretary. The Secretary could
appoint members to a coordinating committee that represented
the most important interests in the Colorado River basin. The
Glen Canyon EIS process recognized the need for such multi-
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faceted representation."7 Thus, the Adaptive Management Work
Group, which is charged with responsibilities specific to Glen
Canyon Dam, is an appropriate model for the kinds of interests
to include on a basin-wide committee. Those interests should
include not only the states and water supply interests, but also
representatives of Indian tribal governments, fish and wildlife

interests, the ecological sciences, public land managers, local
government officials, environmental groups, recreational boaters,
and agriculture. °8
The coordinating committee would be chartered as an
"advisory committee" in compliance with the Federal Advisory
Committee Act ("FACA").4 °9 FACA has rigorous requirements
that presumably can be satisfied.4 1 ° Indeed, the purpose of FACA
would be advanced by such a coordinating committee.4 1' Where

407. See supra notes 137-48 and accompanying text.
408. There are, of course, many separate and even conflicting interests within
each of these classifications. For instance, recreationists include fishers whose
notion of acceptable release patterns differs from that of white-water boaters. Even
more problematic is the fact that there are some 33 tribes with reservations in the
basin, all of which are independent sovereigns. As a practical matter, a workable
committee could not include a representative from each and every tribe, let alone a
representative of every type of recreation, and so on. Perhaps tribes with land on the
river or its tributaries, and tribes with quantified water rights deserve separate or
more heavily weighted representation. Others might be represented by classification
(for example, tribes with unquantified rights). Presumably, some of the nongovernmental interests could also be successfully grouped.
409. See 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 2 (1994).
410. FACA governs the activities of advisory committees. See id. These
committees are usually comprised of private citizens who are asked to provide an
agency with advice or recommendations. Citizen members may be technical experts
or represent diverse political constituencies. Under FACA, advisory committees
must hold their meetings in public, subject to the same exemptions that apply to
meetings of multi-member agencies under the Sunshine Act. See id. FACA resulted
in part from a congressional belief that the advisory committees had proliferated
excessively and wastefully.
411. Although the FACA has been blamed for impeding current efforts to
involve broader representation of the public in federal natural resources
management, there are ways to avoid some of the impediments. See Dover A. NorrisYork, The Federal Advisory Committee Act: Barrieror Boon to Effective Natural
Resource Management?, 26 ENVTL. L. 419 (1996).
The intent of FACA is to curb the expansion of advisory committees, which tend
to increase the influence of powerful, vested interests on federal agencies.
Accordingly, it requires that detailed requirements be met in the formation and
operation of such committees as safeguards against abuses. President Clinton has
further discouraged routine creation of such committees. See Exec. Order No. 12,838,
58 Fed. Reg. 8207 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 14 (1994). Unless the
committee is required by statute, the agency head must find that there are
"compelling considerations for such a committee," and the Director of the Office of
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the task of the committee is to propose policies or decisions that
can be embodied in agency rules and regulations, it could be
established under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990.412
Such tasks could include promulgating operating criteria, annual
plans of operation, surplus and shortage definitions, and water
marketing regulations.
The several measures recommended in this article could
be assigned to the coordinating committee. The Secretary's "side
boards," in terms of ultimate objectives, statutory responsibilities,
and time deadlines would provide the rules of the game. The
coordinating committee could first be given responsibilities for
one of the tasks. Later, the Secretary could give it additional
responsibilities as it proved its capabilities. For instance, an
initial purpose of the committee might be to assist in the preparation of a revised version of the water marketing regulations. If
successful, the committee could be assigned the role of developing
options for dealing with other urgent issues in the basin. As a
means of resolving Indian tribal claims, the coordinating committee could identify, study, and recommend options for dealing with
the stalled effort to construct the Animas-La Plata water project.
Success in dealing with initial issues would equip and encourage
the coordinating committee's participants to tackle other Colorado
River issues. A longer range role for the committee would be to
monitor and provide feedback for adaptive management under
the operating criteria for all projects in the Colorado River
system. The committee, or an appropriate subcommittee, could
also coordinate the several endangered species recovery plans and
could initiate plans for and oversee a Science and Data Center for
the basin.
Whether and when to expand the role of the committee
would depend on how well it performed, which would be a
function of the quality and commitment of its members. If it were

Management and Budget must find its creation is compelled by national interests.

Id.
412. 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (1994). Negotiated rulemaking is a process used by
federal agencies in which interested parties are convened essentially as an advisory
committee to draft proposed regulations. See generally Lawrence Susskind and
Gerard McMahon, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133 (1985). The agency publishes the
regulations drafted by the committee for public comment in a notice of proposed
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act, see id. § 553. See DAVID M.
PRITZKER & DEBORAH S. DALTON, ADMINSTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK 99 (1990).
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especially successful in negotiated rulemaking and in dealing
with adaptive management under the rules adopted, the committee could become the nucleus for a permanent, independent entity
for comprehensive and coordinated governance of the basin's
resources.
CONCLUSION

The Secretary of the Interior plays the pivotal role in
managing the resources of the Colorado River basin. The law of
the river vests the Secretary with responsibility for storing and
releasing water to satisfy the demands of seven states and
Mexico, and to accomplish a variety of environmental goals and
recreational uses. In the process, the Secretary contracts directly
with some water users; in other cases, the Secretary contracts
with districts who in turn contract with water users. The
Secretary generates and markets electrical power, and ensures
that there is space in reservoirs to store water for flood control.
The Secretary also has legal responsibilities to fulfill the United
States' trust relationship with the numerous Indian tribes in the
basin, to protect all endangered species, and to preserve the
recreational, ecological, and cultural resources of Grand Canyon
National Park. Other secretarial responsibilities range from
controlling salinity levels in the river to managing data. Many of
the secretarial powers were delegated by Congress as part of
solutions to dissension among states over basic allocations, part
of the "price" of federal public works projects.
The results of management under this regime have been
unsatisfactory when measured against standards of economic
efficiency, equity, and ecological sustainability. The development
and management of the river's resources have been in the hands
of a few, with ultimate responsibility falling on the Secretary.
Subsidies have led to economically unwise and wasteful decisions.
Many parties with a substantial stake in the outcome of decisions
have been left out. Indian tribes are notable examples. And the
environment has been radically altered as a consequence of
damming, diverting, and polluting the Colorado River. It is not
surprising that the Secretary's job is controversial. The interests
affected by the management of the Colorado River are numerous
and diverse. The issues individually are politically charged;
collectively they demand extremely difficult choices and tradeoffs.
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As competition for the basin's resources becomes keener,
it is reasonable to expect more of the dissension and rivalry that
has marked the history of the Colorado River. Those who are at
the table on some issues-primarily state governments-will
fight harder for what they believe they need. Those who are not
part of the process will use litigation or any political means at
their disposal to gain advantage. As a result, uncertainty will
reign and resources will continue to suffer. Realizing this, parties
who have been consulted in past decisions, as well as those who
have not, are beginning to seek consensus on an array of difficult
issues.
Several promising initiatives suggest approaches to the
basin's problems. They include water marketing, endangered
species protection, and operation of Glen Canyon Dam under
adaptive management principles. It is the thesis of this article
that those experiments can be expanded through the use of
broader, more collaborative decisionmaking. If, indeed, that does
not occur voluntarily, the Secretary should'promote new mechanisms to achieve collaborative governance by sharing his authority and decisionmaking prerogatives.
Especially ripe opportunities for shared governance in the
Colorado River basin include drafting new water marketing
regulations, defining the circumstances warranting surplus and
shortage declarations, revising operating criteria for the coordinated operation of all the major dams in the system, and synthesizing multiple implementation programs to recover endangered
species of fish. The Secretary can enhance these and other multiinterest efforts by creating a Science and Data Center to conduct
studies and distribute information, and by initiating a study of
transferring federal facilities and the use of power revenues to
fund such efforts. One means of accomplishing these tasks would
be to convene a Colorado River Basin Coordinating Committee,
chartered as an advisory committee under the Federal Advisory
Committee Act.
This incremental approach to better, more inclusive
governance of the Colorado River basin is more realistic than
expecting Congress or the various interests to create a new, allpurpose institution according to the best design political science
can offer. Processes that accomplish specific tasks successfully
could evolve into a new, permanent institution or at least inform
the process of designing one. But the primary motive for undertaking the incremental tasks identified in this article is to
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address issues that are too serious and urgent to await acceptance of a completely new institution. The issues are also too
important to tolerate the plodding efforts of interests that are not
committed to a solution, or processes that are narrow in either
their scope of issues or in the number of parties at the table.
Failing to develop comprehensive solutions will mean more
environmental degradation, the risk of abrupt federal interventions under the Endangered Species Act, protracted, costly
litigation, and federally imposed solutions that founder because
they are lack participation from all the concerned groups.
The Secretary therefore should not hesitate to press the
parties to propose solutions and decisions based on comprehensive consideration of all the resources and interests affected. The
Secretary's promise to accept the legally justifiable outcome of
such a process would encourage reluctant parties. If they do not
act based on that incentive, the Secretary should convene them
under his existing authority. Regardless of how it is convened,
the reward for a successful process will be long term results that
are more efficient, equitable, and ecologically sustainable.

